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This thesis addresses two issues related to maritime risk. The first concerns
recognizing high-volume shipping destined for U.S. ports initially journeys through
foreign waters and ports where crime, piracy and terrorism are hazards. The second issue
is prioritizing maritime risk mitigation in response to multi-variable threats and
vulnerabilities. This subject is compounded by limited resources and a reliance on
collaborative partnerships. The thesis mainly focuses on the relationship between piracy
and U.S. maritime interests since piracy has a nexus offshore and in waterways where
U.S.-bound ships originate or transit. The approach is three-fold. First, the initial two
chapters identify piracy as a threat which shipping encounters in global hot-spots before
entering U.S. waters. Chapter 1 associates connections between piracy and terrorism,
mariners’ safety in regions/waterways, and challenges of eradicating piracy, with a
focused study on the Straits of Malacca. Chapter 2 identifies when offshore piracy may
threaten the U.S., emphasizing the Gulf of Guinea. Chapter 3 transitions back to U.S.
solutions in protecting ferry and cruise passengers within confined terminal spaces.
The thesis results indicate risk-related findings. Chapter 1 highlights collaborative
challenges foreign nations need to overcome while trying to protect citizens and eradicate
crime/piracy. Also in Chapter 1, the findings reveal piracy and terrorism in the Straits of
Malacca do not appear related. Chapter 2 categorizes the types of offshore piracy that
pose risk to the U.S. Chapter 3 undertakes a multi-variable analysis of inter-modal risk
mitigations and suggests certain airport models may work in ferry and cruise terminals.
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Thesis Introduction
Threats to the maritime environment are unique in their complexity. For example,
conceive a scenario in which a 700-foot gas tanker carrying anhydrous ammonia is
breached by explosive charges in a congested U.S. port. In addition to burning,
suffocating and blinding scores of civilians, the chemical release would overwhelm
responders’ capabilities and equipment. If the explosion were to occur in a major port,
this would entail co-location with a highly populated city. Were the detonation timed to
coincide with a passing cruise ship or ferry at peak travel time, thousands of passengers
could be affected by the blast or downwind effects. Further, the vessel would be likely
owned by a foreign company, typically registered under the flag of yet another country,
and generally manned by an assorted crew of foreign nationals. In the last year, this ship
may have experienced direct contact with crime or terrorism, potentially evading
Somalian pirates or repelling armed robbers in the Straits of Malacca. In the last month,
the tanker may have spent several days at anchorage in a third world country’s waters
while awaiting open pier space, or idled for hours in a queue of ships pending passage
through Turkey’s Bosporus Strait. These circumstances make the ship highly vulnerable
to a shaped charge or limpet mine being attached by divers for time-delay detonation in a
U.S. port. In the last week, the ship may have offloaded at three overseas port calls before
arriving to the U.S. Each of these foreign ports may have corrupt dock workers or
government employees that are amenable to bribes in exchange for allowing radiological
or biological contaminants to be loaded onboard. Only a random Customs or Coast Guard
boarding with minimal detection gear would stand between detection and destruction in
this hypothetical scenario.
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As this scenario indicates, shipping is complex, dangerous and transnational. Add
in high volume; over 95% of all U.S. imports arrive by ship. Thousands of foreign
vessels, many carrying chemicals, gas or fertilizers, arrive in U.S. ports daily. Shipping,
by its nature is a risk-laden business. Anti-American sentiment among foreign crews,
narco-funded ownership or lax security standards at overseas ports are all vectors for
maritime sabotage or terrorism. This thesis does not solve the introductory scenario. Each
step that can go wrong is complex and interwoven with other aspects. Security experts
also recognize there are finite resources, limited thresholds for delaying cargo and a need
to prioritize unacceptable risks. If the scenario is grim and the options for countering the
consequences even grimmer, then how does this thesis add value?
The first two chapters begin overseas by examining piracy in foreign locations
where U.S.-bound shipping transits. These locales include the Straits of Malacca, one of
the busiest shipping lanes on earth, plagued until recent years by hit-and-run pirates, and
the Gulf of Guinea, a boon for premium offshore oil. The Gulf entices major petroleum
companies to drill offshore for exploration and production. The oil also attracts pirates
who steal from the oil rigs, ships and barges; black-market resale is a thriving business
for Gulf pirates. Although neither piracy issue is in U.S. waters, each stems back to the
scenario in which harming a U.S. port has linkage to a foreign nexus. U.S. maritime risk
therefore has roots overseas. The first two chapters’ associate piracy with their regional
origins, addressing the concerns of states where offshore and choke-point piracy threaten
vessels and crew alike. The linkage between piracy and U.S. risk is a topic that has not
been previously well-researched. Nor has the subject of Chapter 3 - the challenge of
identifying inter-modal security practices that can work in both terminal hubs.
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For our purposes, the term risk will be defined throughout the thesis in DHS
terminology, where Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence (TVC). Each of these
terms can be weighted according to varying scenarios (i.e. a military base might have low
vulnerability to attack, but a high consequence, if successful). Risk in our definition
assigns equal value to each TVC-term.
In short, the first two chapters examine facets of piracy that compel risk
prioritization based on the overseas nature of shipping and law enforcement/resource-
constraints. A first chapter study of the Straits of Malacca raises the question of whether
piracy and maritime terrorism are connected and whether targeting one helps extinguish
the other. If so, then counter-piracy strategies may offer value as “buy one, get one” for
counter-terrorism. In the second chapter, the thesis asks whether the U.S. has risk-
concerns related to offshore piracy. To accomplish this, the study uses the Gulf of
Guinea, a region where piracy remains a problem. In terms of risk prioritization, piracy
off Nigeria may not sound the same alarms as Somalian piracy did, although Nigerian
piracy is more aggressive.
The last Chapter of the thesis assesses what is required for risk reduction
protocols to crossover from an airport or rail transportation hub to a cruise or ferry
terminal. While only the third chapter directly addresses solutions to the challenges posed
by the opening scenario, each chapter seeks ways to help prioritize risk and
counterbalance resource constraints in a maritime setting. Two Chapters look at issues
related to piracy in regions where shipping originates or travels. The third Chapter
appraises U.S. ferry and cruise terminals, unique locations where waterborne and shore-
based threats converge and thousands of travelers gather.
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Using the opening scenario, the thesis examines relationships between maritime
risk and security variables that are not obvious, by seeking to define new ways of
recognizing and forecasting maritime risk. Piracy for example, affects ships that arrive in
the U.S. The final Chapter turns focus towards U.S. airport risk-mitigation procedures,
incorporating lessons from established passenger terminal practices. The thesis explores a
risk analysis linking U.S. ports to global shipping and searches new methods of applying
existing airport security practices to reduce risk passenger ferry and cruise terminals,
often directly adjacent to arriving foreign ships.
Chapter 1 Overview
This Chapter examines piracy issues related to perceptions of risk, including a
nexus to terrorism. Since shipping has global reach; the U.S. will likely have maritime
concerns with piracy if terrorism is associated. The model for the study is the Straits of
Malacca. Since shipping destined for the U.S. often must first transit global hotspots, the
Straits of Malacca present a strong example of a location that links to U.S. ports. Over
70% of shipping destined for the U.S. transits through this narrow chokepoint, an area
that in recent years has suffered piracy.
The literature review considers who Malaccan pirates are, their motivations, and
explores any potential nexus between pirates and maritime-based terrorists who also
operate in the region. The case study looks at collaborative partnerships in the littoral
Straits between Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia and the types of challenges these
proximate nations needed to overcome in attempting to end piracy. An implied analogy to
the case study is extracting lessons that may apply to the frequent challenges encountered
by federal-state-local partners who also have cultural, jurisdictional and authority issues.
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My initial two-fold hypothesis suggests vessels transiting the Straits tend to be safe from
piracy and terrorism. In the end, this tends to be true, although the data reveal smaller
vessels are still in danger from piracy. The second part of the Chapter’s hypothesis
affirms that littoral counter-piracy challenges were overcome. This assertion is supported
and the methods of overcoming risks from piracy are highlighted.
The case study discovers several key challenges to combatting piracy in SE Asia.
Among these are the function and importance of sovereignty, the rejection of U.S.
intervention, and the difficulty of verifying the magnitude of piracy when it is
underreported or reported inaccurately. In addition, this region offers both hard and soft
power approaches from three governments that jointly fight piracy and discourage
maritime terrorism from developing.
Chapter 2 Overview
This Chapter addresses the types of situations when offshore piracy might
threaten the U.S. Beginning with a hypothesis that gels around energy concerns and harm
to U.S. citizens, both the literature review and case study eventually reveal other piracy
variables present greater risk to the U.S. The Chapter’s research leads to a revised
hypothesis that ultimately reflects the importance of European Union imports from the
Gulf region, and likelihood of U.S. involvement if American/allied citizens are kidnapped
or murdered in this violent environment. The literature also helps typify the motivations
and personality types that drawn towards piracy. This profile is cross-compared with
Somali pirates, offshore criminals that share certain commonalities with Gulf pirates and
differ greatly in other respects. The idea of piracy as ‘opportunity’ is highlighted as a
driving stimulus, especially in the Gulf where limited options exist for other livelihoods.
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The Chapter’s case study examines a range of factors that might place U.S.
interests at risk. These include decreased U.S. and European imports, impacts to multi-
national corporations investing in the region, impacts to both coastal and central African
states, and kidnappings or murder of ship crews and oil rig personnel. The paper’s
analysis section matches up the most dangerous piracy character profile (Gulf of Guinea)
with internationally-related factors that might threaten or endanger the U.S. These factors
are mined and interpreted from data in the case study and examined in a macro-level
context. Essentially, this involves looking at piracy-related impacts to the U.S. using a
strategic risk-lens (i.e. energy impacts, foreign import transitions, Gulf-state profits). In
combination with this high-level view, the role of the singular prototypical offshore pirate
is addressed. The Chapter combines a top-down perspective (threats to U.S. strategy)
with a bottom-up assessment (individual pirate-profile), examining and prioritizing the
type of risk conditions in which the U.S. would be likely threatened by offshore piracy.
Chapter 3 Overview
This Chapter focuses on risk-based solutions in the U.S. port environment. This
process identifies solutions meticulously, first by scrutinizing transportation security
concepts via the literature review. The selected terms embody risk-principles that are
already employed by airport specialists and to an extent, by rail security. In the course of
this initial evaluation, the following core criteria are deemed as offering highest
versatility for inter-modal transportation security: resiliency, effectiveness, efficiency, and
risk-layering. The rationale for selecting these terms is explained in the Chapter, as is
their utility in high-volume airports or ferry terminals. In addition, I have coined the term
Human-Technology Interface (HTI) and used it freely, as HTI implies neither a machine
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nor human can accomplish quality security alone. HTI-based models underscore the
value of synergizing computer-derived anomalies with on-scene decision making.
The Chapter’s hypothesis infers that the airport protocols best suited for maritime
passengers meet the five criteria found essential to risk mitigation. Three different types
of models are then tested in a case study to determine whether they adhere to these
criteria. The models include the British TASS system, Social Force Model and Behavior
Detection protocols. Each model is gauged against the five criteria using strict business
rules (stated in Methodology).
The case study seeks long-term maritime security solutions that are verifiable as:
multi-layered, resilient, efficient, effective and able to fuse technology and human
judgment (HTI). This combination suggests even just a few personnel can accomplish
quality risk buy-down in even the most congested transportation hubs. The Chapter
calibrates solutions using transportation security systems already employed by airports,
rather than devising new models from scratch. In the end, the hypothesis suggests that the
Social Force Model would be best suited for adjusting to the security demands of a ferry
or cruise ship terminal.
To recap, the three thesis chapters are characterized by several underlying
maritime risk-related tenets. The first involves finding ways to offset resource limitations
and test the boundaries of U.S. risk tolerance for piracy, either as a nexus to terrorism
(Chapter 1), or as an impediment to American strategic agenda (Chapter 2). The second
risk-related tenet is the idea behind Chapter 3 - the concept of crossover utility. This final
chapter suggests certain airport security models can transpose to U.S. ferry and cruise
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terminals. There is an opportunity for the terminals to employ airport security concepts
already tested and refined since 9/11.
In short, the thesis reveals several noteworthy findings that relate back to the
opening scenario. For one, there does not currently appear to be a linkage between piracy
and terrorism. This is important since U.S.-destined shipping transits through piracy
hotspots. Collaboration is also essential to developing counter-piracy strategies. This was
demonstrated in the Straits of Malacca as three nations combined to overcome cultural
and geo-political variances. As with the beginning scenario, defining collaboration
between local, state and federal partners is vital; there are lessons to be learned from three
nations who used both hard and soft power approaches to achieve solutions. On a
strategic level, offshore piracy violence indicates there may be a grander threat to the
U.S. in terms of piracy’s potential to reduce EU oil imports, as this dynamic would affect
international relations. Finally, selective transportation security systems appear to offer
crossover utility benefits; airports already prioritize transportation hub risk factors.
The introductory emphasis on risk management and limited resources oblige
security experts to consider how proven models can work in transportation contexts that
serve both air and ship passengers. As discussed in the beginning, eliminating all threat
variables is impossible, but incorporating best practices is attainable. Piracy and multi-
modal transportation protocols can show maritime risk and security specialists a new way




In 2000, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) cited 75 acts of piracy in the
Straits of Malacca, a vital shipping connection between the Indian Ocean and the South
China Sea. In 2008 and 2009, there were three acts of piracy in the same region.1 In 2011,
IMB cited zero attacks in these Straits.2 How did this drastic reduction in piracy happen?
Did the coordinated efforts of the littoral states (Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia)
simply reduce piracy and limit terrorism in a region surrounded by water, or did other
factors contribute?
The Straits of Malacca are a vital sea lane of communication (SLOC) for global
shipping. Over 500 miles long, and yet just more than a mile wide at its narrowest point,
these Straits are a slender conduit that supports passage of nearly 30% of world trade
each year, and 2/3rds of all liquid natural gas shipping. The Straits see between 50,000 and
60,000 vessels transit annually, making it the most transited route in the world.3 The
Malaccan Straits are also the fastest route from the Indian to the Pacific Ocean. The threat
of piracy or armed robbery at sea here has vast implications. For example, the Straits are
a maritime chokepoint, a narrow body of water where shipping accidents or an intentional
vessel sinking can clog the flow of traffic and shut down the waterway.
Should these Straits be blocked through piracy or terrorism, the repercussions
would be severe. In the event of a blockage, ships would require 500 miles further transit
1 Catherine Z. Raymond, “Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait”, Naval War College Review,
Summer (2009): Vol. 62, No. 3
2 Oceans Beyond Piracy 2013, http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/malacca-strait-patrols Accessed
25FEB2014
3 Graham Gerard Ong, “The Threat of Maritime Terrorism and Piracy”, Regional Outlook (2006): 12-5.
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to circumvent the region, putting worldwide shipping near full capacity. Unavoidably,
this would increase shipping rates and delay global delivery of goods such as coal. This
series of events would (in varying degrees) impact world economies.4 The status of the
Straits also has implications for American military force projection and naval mobility. A
potential closing of the Straits could compel U.S. Navy battle groups to detour around
Australia, adding two weeks transit time, 6,000 additional miles, and $7 million more for
every re-route.5 The Straits, therefore, must remain open.
Based on this background, this chapter asks two difficult questions about piracy.
First, and more over-arching, are piracy and terrorism interrelated? Using the Straits of
Malacca as a point of reference, this is a complex area of the world. Three nations are
within immediate proximity of another, surrounded by water, and factious Islamic
separatist groups have established roots in this region. It would be easy to cite a linkage
to Al Qaeda and declare the Straits are in peril; this is often done with Arab nations
where Al Qaeda-affiliates reside. Yet, as a predominantly Muslim region, the littoral
states of Southeast Asia present a different socio-political dynamic than the Middle East.
In fact, as other global areas have seen terrorism flare in hotspots or even grown
insidiously, the Straits have seen a general decline in piracy and maritime terrorism
chatter is low. So, can the Straits be judged safe? While it is difficult to tell whether
governments’ initiatives are working, supplementary factors are at play, or if this is just
calm before the storm, the first part of our hypothesis suggests the Straits of Malacca can
be declared safe from piracy and largely (by counter-piracy association), safe from
4 J. Ashley Roach, “Enhancing Maritime Security in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore”, Journal of
International Affairs, Fall/Winter (2005): Vol. 59, No. 1.
5 Jurg E. Kursener, “Straits of Malacca and Singapore- Unique Chokepoint”, Singapore Focus, Naval Forces
11/2007
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terrorism. The literature review encompasses expert opinions that generally support the
fact Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia have taken distinct actions that attributed to
reducing the frequency of piracy attacks in the Strait, and subsequently, by their
effectiveness, threats of maritime terrorism. These actions include multi-national policy
agreements, augmented surface/air patrols and even understated methods like outreach to
moderate Muslim leaders.  In many ways, their triumph is as much about collaborations
as it is their operational effectiveness.
Next, were the littoral SE Asian nations able to overcome underlying challenges
in their collaborative effort to reduce threats of piracy and terrorism in the Strait of
Malacca? The hypothesis suggests cultural and geo-proximate challenges involved in
counter-piracy were overcome by three distinct nations that are physically proximate,
confronted by maritime-based threats along contiguous borders and territorial waters, and
compounded by differing state authorities and cultures. The underlying challenges faced
by these littoral states requires a case study that hinges on how political, economic, and
cultural nuances were overcome by these nations when forming regional strategies.
Lastly, the analysis melds key findings from the literature review and the case
study to appraise how differing regional perceptions of piracy and maritime terrorism
have led to a variety of best practices that help keep this vital world chokepoint open. As
discussed, global shipping eventually turns into American interests when these vessels
reach U.S. ports. The literature review incorporates perspectives from academics and
maritime professionals, both well-versed in South East (SE) Asian maritime security, to




Are piracy and terrorism interrelated? The Straits of Malacca presents the greatest
likelihood of a connection and is the focal area of study in this literature review.
By the Numbers
Was piracy ever really a problem in the Straits of Malacca? Ho contends that
statistically, piracy has always been a minimal concern, when examined purely by
percentages. Even in heavier years of piracy (2000-2005), attacks occurred at a frequency
of 0.04% to 0.11% of all shipping that transited through the Straits.6 These numbers
appear small when compared to equivalent crime statistics in most major cities. However,
the percentages exponentially surpass the population assault rates (per 100,000 persons)
for both Indonesia (.0009%) and Singapore (.00015%),7 two relatively crime-free nations.
Ho’s frequency of piracy attacks would seem insignificant when compared to other
nations where land-based crime statistics are prevalent.
In the littoral states, however, maritime piracy actually stands out as above-
average when compared with assaults. In addition, Ho notes that the vessels attacked in
the Straits tend to be trawlers and fishing vessels, far smaller boats than the freight or
tanker vessels often associated with piracy. There are two important interpretations that
must be made of Ho’s study. First, the rates of piracy, while slight, are still higher than
the rates of crime on land in these littoral nations (Malaysian rate of assault was
unavailable). Second, the types of vessels in question are generally small boats being
6 Joshua H. Ho, “The Security of Sea Lanes in SE Asia”, Asian Survey, Vol. 46, No. 4 (July/August 2006), pp.
558-574
7 NationMaster: Crime, Assault Rates, Countries Compared. (2011 data) Accessed from
http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Crime/Assault-rate
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attacked by other little boats; the opinion that very large crude tankers are routinely
attacked is a misnomer.
What Makes a Pirate (and potentially, a Maritime Terrorist)?
The fact that large ships are generally not frequently targeted should not deter our
scrutiny as to whether piracy or maritime terrorism is cause for alarm. Who these pirates
are should be the foremost concern. Ho categorizes the pirates as falling into one of
several categories: criminals, gang members, or “armed separatists.”8 To support this
view, Ho cites Young and Valencia, who distinguish pirates by their motivation. Piracy,
they contend is a financially motivated crime. Terrorists, on the other hand, act based on
a religious ideology and/or need to right a perceived wrong. Young and Valencia’s view
however, does not preclude the possibility that the Malaccan Strait pirates can still be
acquiring finances to help fund terrorism, or that the pirates may be either knowingly (or
unwittingly) teaching tactics to terrorists for ideological purposes. It also does not speak
to the extent of damage that a few small armed boats can accomplish when they swarm or
ram vessels, such as Al Qaeda accomplished in targeting the USS Cole and M/V
Limburg. Furthermore, despite air and sea patrol initiatives from the contributing nations,
it is difficult to distinguish fishermen in the Strait from pirates who appear exactly like
fishermen, or from terrorists who also look like fishermen. I do concur with one of Ho’s
major takeaways, his depiction that “piracy forms the background noise from which
maritime terrorist attacks may materialize”9 clear associates the two, and implies piracy
cannot be ignored when assessing maritime piracy in this region.
8 Ho, “The Security of Sea Lanes in SE Asia”, p. 562
9 Ibid., p. 562
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Bad Luck, Followed by Worse Luck
The Malaccan Straits have suffered two significant events in the last 17 years that
may have furthered high rates of piracy at the start of this century. First, as Young and
Valencia point out, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 not only decimated SE Asian
economies, it created political upheaval, particularly in the Indonesian government, the
nation from which many of the pirates hail.10 Since a majority of pirates were originally
fishermen by trade, they simply applied their maritime expertise and knowledge of
currents, shoals and topography to the more lucrative profession of piracy, especially as
supply chains dwindled during the crisis.
Second, the tsunami of 2004 wreaked physical devastation a few years later on the
littoral states, particularly in Aceh, Indonesia. Raymond says as many as 70% of the
pirates may have originated from this region, an area hit hard by the tsunami. It is unclear
whether the tsunami- related population was decimated or a sudden presence of multi-
national emergency responders and military aid in SE Asia helped create an environment
unfavorable to piracy. Alternatively, the littoral nations’ 2004-2005 initiative to combat
piracy can be credited with drastically reducing piracy in the region. I contend no one
factor is sufficient to understand the decrease of piracy in the Straits of Malacca.
Trilateral enforcement efforts were likely reinforced by a rebounding economy. Tsunami-
related deaths of pirate leadership weakened pirate gangs. Naval and relief-worker
reinforcements in the littoral states also have made piracy increasingly difficult to
accomplish. Finally, there were fewer vessels available to attack.
10 Adam J. Young and Mark J. Valencia, “Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Rectitude
and Utility”, Contemporary Southeast Asia (2003): Vol. 25, No. 2 (Aug)
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Maritime Terrorism: Cause for Alarm?
For academics, maritime terrorism remains a debatable threat. To start, while the
Indonesian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah (J.I.) is still actively evaluating future
targets, Chalk, for instance, cites that in spite of J.I.’s presence, the “risk of a decisive
maritime strike in the Malacca Strait is low.”11 Chalk states that while attack scenarios
on LNG and freighters are difficult to achieve, as recently as 2010, a joint
Malaysian/Singapore collaboration led to the arrest of 14 J.I. terrorists planning attack in
Straits. Clearly, J.I. has not been completely suppressed. The arrests followed a notable
May 2009 Al Qaeda communique that declared maritime targets and chokepoints as
marked for destruction. Despite these arrests, Chalk argues that in order for a maritime
attack to succeed, the terrorists would require fast attack vessels and the target would
most likely need to be a ferry, since accessibility to ferries and their vulnerable structural
design make them a compelling target. Chalk describes this apparent contradiction by
stating the only organization in the region capable of accomplishing this type of attack is
J.I., a group with minimal maritime training. Further, Chalk believes J.I. is unlikely to
build this skill set now, based on blows to their organizational leadership. Ong tends to
agree with Chalk, citing that while Malaysian authorities interrupted a 2001 maritime
attack in the Straits and Singapore prevented a similar maritime terrorist plot in 2002, the
probability of a maritime attack is not supported by historical data. Ong explains there
has only been a 225:1 ratio of land attacks to maritime attacks from 1981-2001.12 Ho
concurs with the low probability of maritime terrorism, stating maritime accounts for
approximately 2% of all attacks over the last 30 years.
11 Peter Chalk, “Assessing the Recent Terrorist Threat to the Malacca Strait”, CTC Sentinel (2010): Vol. 3.
Issue 4
12 Ong, “The Threat of Maritime Terrorism and Piracy”, p. 13
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Murphy concurs with both Chalk and Ho, yet for different reasoning. Murphy
states that a maritime attack offers low risk reward and contends that “maritime terrorism
is not a serious threat.”13 According to Murphy, terrorism at sea requires knowledge of
several trade crafts, namely boat handling and attack techniques. In addition, committing
terrorism at sea does not compute intuitively into the minds of people who generally live
on land. The media is also limited in access to maritime terrorism. The impact of an event
at sea is reduced to the few who experience it firsthand, as opposed to targeting media-
rich, populated cities. Lorenz concurs, citing “maritime terrorism necessitates
considerable overhead, appropriate vessels, mariner skills and, specialist weapons (and)
explosive capabilities.”14 Lorenz suggests that terrorist funding, especially in an era
where authorities can seize and freeze bank accounts has made terrorist events too
expensive and risky to entertain the idea of pursuing an attack that might not work.
Vulnerabilities to Consider
Murphy does cite a major vulnerability for maritime terrorism in SE Asia as the
massive archipelago that comprises this stretch of ocean. The volume of small islands
offers potential to create “black holes.”15 Murphy references the Niger Delta and
Mindanao as other examples of black hole activity.16 In another article by Chalk, he
identifies a vulnerability of the cargo trade system, the concept termed within the industry
13 Martin N. Murphy, “The Unwanted Challenge”, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (2008), 134, No. 12: 48-
51.
14 Akiva J. Lorenz, “Al Qaeda’s Maritime Threat”, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Israel
Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC) 2007.
15 Murphy, “The Unwanted Challenge”, p. 48-51
16 The term “black hole” infers locales where insurgency is far enough removed from routine government
access that terrorism can breed followership, establish training camps and then challenge local
government authority.
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as “just enough, just in time.”17 This term implies that cargo is delivered globally in such
a way that costs to wholesalers, retailers and consumers are kept to a minimum. There are
few excess products in a port or distribution chain. Generally, this is a good thing. For
those bent on impacting the global supply chain though, this offers opportunity.
Fortunately, at least in Chalk’s view, disrupting shipping is complicated and untried. He
suggests that an event of this type is unlikely as disrupting the supply chain is not
sensational, plus oceanic shipping takes place out of public view.
Chalk does cite one noteworthy and differing point of view on this subject - the
Aegis Group’s 2005 Report on Piracy and Maritime Terrorism,18 which underscored the
severity of impacting the Straits of Malacca, a major sea lane of communication (SLOC).
While Lloyd’s of London took heed of the report and declared the Strait the equivalent of
a war-zone, the littoral states refuted the report, along with any formal connection
between piracy and maritime terrorism in the Strait.
Banlaoi sees an association between maritime terrorism and piracy and suspects
this dynamic will only continue emerging in the Straits. His view is that “the line between
piracy and terrorism [has] blurred in Southeast Asia.”19 Pirates can seize a vessel like
terrorists did in seizing commercial aircraft on 9/11, or worse, get aboard a vessel and
plant either a weapon or biological dispersion device that can be detonated or released in
the next major port. By mimicking pirate techniques, Banlaoi views that maritime
terrorists can board and depart a vessel, unsuspectingly planting the seed to cause real
17 Peter Chalk, “The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges for
the United States”, RAND-Project Air Force. Santa Monica, CA (2008), p. 44
18 Ibid., p. 55
19 Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia”, Naval War College Review (2005): 58 (4)
(09): 63-80.
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harm in a populated environment like Singapore or Los Angeles. He cites Abu Sayyaf, a
radicalized Muslim terrorist organization’s role in the sinking of Superferry 14; Abu
Sayyaf reportedly detonated a device onboard. Officials had been watching Abu Sayyaf
but did not suspect this group (with a sea-faring background) would execute civilians
with this particular attack profile. Banlaoi cautions us not to underestimate the ingenuity
of organized littoral-state groups, the parallels between piracy and terrorism, or the
infrequency of maritime terrorism, which can lull a false sense of security. Banlaoi states
“maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia must prudently be considered no longer a question
of if, but rather of when and where.”20
Clarifying Terms
One of the difficulties in determining whether piracy is truly a problem is
interpreting the potentially misleading data sets on piracy. To explain, Bradford describes
that piracy may be underreported. Since small fishing vessels are frequently targeted,
these local fishermen may well be unaware of International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
reporting criteria21 or the role of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), a trilateral initiative that
also captures piracy data. Vessel owners may also be unwilling to make reports out of
fear of reprisal from corrupt local authorities. Plus, there is a financial downside to
making a report of piracy/armed robbery. A vessel owner who has already suffered fiscal
loss from piracy may be reluctant to suspend their fishing or vessel operations while a
formal investigation is completed, and increased insurance rate premiums would only add
20 Ibid., p. 65
21 John F. Bradford, “Shifting the Tides Against Piracy in SE Asian Waters”, Asian Survey, (2008): Vol. 48,
No. 3 (May/June), p. 473-491
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to their financial burden. For these reasons, Bradford suggests those who suffer piracy
unsuspectingly contribute to harming their governments from making sensible anti-
terrorism decisions. For example, data that is lacking on piracy attacks only limits
governmental justification for future air/sea resource acquisitions and prevents assigning
patrols to meaningful locations where piracy and/or terrorism can be thwarted. Bradford
also implies that pirates who operate unconstrained make more money and this in turn
allows them to acquire better radios, advanced weapons, radar, and other equipment,22
continuing a vicious cycle. Murphy also describes the situation in the Straits by which
Indonesian pirate gangs cross over to Malaysian waters where they rob fishing vessels.
Because the pirates do not kill, or generally harm the fishermen, he terms this
“sustainable predation… in that the cost and physical danger it adds to the fishermen's
lives are never enough to stop them putting to sea completely.”23
Lastly, one of the greatest challenges in evaluating a maritime terrorism profile of
the littoral states is defining the semantics of how piracy differs from terrorism, as well as
making a distinction between piracy and armed robbery of a ship. According to
International Maritime Bureau (IMB)’s international shipping counterpart, the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), piracy takes place on the high seas, while
armed robbery occurs within 12 miles of a nation’s shoreline. Aside from the noteworthy
differences in geographical location, the IMO definitions of these incidents are very
22 Bradford, “Shifting the Tides Against Piracy in SE Asian Waters”, p. 476
23 Martin N. Murphy, “Suppression of Piracy and Maritime Terrorism”, Naval War College Review (2007):
60 (3) (Summer): 23-45
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similar - both are “illegal acts of violence, committed for private ends.”24 Kim states that
“there is no agreed definition of maritime terrorism in international law.”25 This is
problematic. As an additional key reference for the ocean-going ships that transit the
Straits, the International Law of The Sea Conventions defines piracy but prohibits
applying piracy-laws to acts of maritime terrorism. This creates a loophole for maritime
terrorists. If caught at sea, it would be difficult to prosecute offenders until piracy or
armed robbery statutes can be defined, much less charged against maritime terrorists.
Even more puzzling is clearly identifying ownership of the ships that can be exploited for
either piracy or maritime terrorism. The flag-state of the vessel is a corporate convention
that allows ship-ownership to sail under the ‘flag’ of a country that is paid for
sponsorship. Nincic explains that “a list of countries in which Al Qaeda’s vessels have
allegedly been flagged illustrates this point: Yemen, Somalia, Senegal, Liberia and St
Vincent have all been tied to the ‘Al Qaeda navy.’”26
The Cultural Variable
One of the unique challenges facing the littoral Malacca Strait nations is the
perception as to which parties are responsible for maritime terrorism along the junctures
of these Muslim nations. Aljunied points out that the terrorist group and Al Qaeda
affiliate J.I. “hopes that maritime states in Southeast Asia will mismanage terrorism as
being a ‘Muslim problem’, thus fuelling hard feelings against the state and other co-
24 ReCAAP, Definitions and Methodology in Classifying Incidents
http://www.recaap.org/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?Command=Core_Download
&EntryId=290&PortalId=0&TabId=78 Accessed 25FEB2014
25 Kim, Suk Kyoon, “Maritime Security Initiatives in East Asia: Assessment and the Way Forward”, Ocean
Development & International Law (2011): 42 (3) (Jul): 227-44.
26 Nincic, “The Challenge of Maritime Terrorism: Threat identification, WMD and Regime Response”, p.
634
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religionists.”27 In other words, these nations are compelled to be cautious how they
publicly state issues of maritime terrorism, treading carefully when attributing blame to a
group that may benefit by being blamed. In addition, any show of armed or verbal
support from the U.S. would be welcomed by J.I. as “anti-Muslim” propaganda, capable
of rallying anti-government sentiments. This apprehension makes it difficult for regional
security specialists and littoral states to definitively assert the existence of maritime
terrorism without fail-proof evidence. Aljunied illustrates this trepidation benefits up-
and-coming prospects for maritime terrorism as the U.S. would hesitate to interfere in
this region unless terrorism was confirmed, fearing a rally of anti-Americanism if
innocent fishermen or island-based communities were inaccurately vilified.
Hypothesis
This Chapter uses a twofold Hypothesis to assess the success of counter-piracy
initiatives and growth of maritime terrorism in the Straits of Malacca. The first question
asked is - Are piracy and terrorism interrelated? (The Straits of Malacca make an
illustrative model for this study). In response, the literature review suggests the first part
of the hypothesis is the Straits of Malacca can be declared safe from piracy (and by
association between counter-piracy and counter-terrorism efforts), also declared
generally safe from terrorism. The next question asks - Were the littoral SE Asian
nations able to overcome underlying challenges in their collaborative effort to reduce
threats of piracy and terrorism in the Strait of Malacca? The second half of this
Chapter’s hypothesis suggests our case study will illustrate that cultural and geo-
proximate challenges involved in counter-piracy were overcome.
27Syed Mohammed Ad'ha Aljunied, “Countering Terrorism in Maritime Southeast Asia: Soft and Hard
Power Approaches”, Journal of Asian and African Studies (2012): 47: 652
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Methodology
The objective of the case study is identifying what types of challenges the littoral
states encountered when reducing the threat of piracy over the last few years. This
includes improving our understanding of whether piracy was ever an issue and how
recent upticks in Indonesian piracy should be assessed in a statistically relevant context.
It is also necessary to assess views on piracy and maritime terrorism as a shared
concern, particularly where the two subjects may intertwine. Our case study seeks to
explain how a reduction in piracy may, as an offshoot, reduce growth prospects for
maritime terrorism. Finally, the Chapter identifies whether there are security (or other)
measures that should remain consistent in the region if piracy is expected to remain at
low levels and for maritime terrorism to remain absent in the Malaccan environment,
where global shipping also transits.
Case Study: Strait of Malacca
Were the littoral SE Asian nations able to overcome underlying challenges in their
collaborative effort to reduce threats of piracy and terrorism in the Strait of Malacca?
Malacca, there might be a Problem
In June 2005, the Joint War Committee of Lloyd’s Market Association, the
leading global shipping insurer, had seen enough of piracy in the Malacca Straits. Lloyds
declared these Straits “an area in jeopardy of war, strikes, terrorism and related perils.”28
For Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore; this essentially made the Straits comparable to a
28 Yun Yun Teo “Target Malacca Straits: Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia”, Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, (2007): 30: p. 541
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war zone. The call to action was clear; piracy was being viewed on an internationally
economic scale as a serious issue, although the littoral states did not see piracy as an
urgent problem. Something needed to be done.  In order to make immediate and long-
lasting impacts, the SE Asian nations would need to collaborate since the Straits
encompass territorial waters of all three littoral states.
Sharing Boats and Planes
Some of the regional solutions took hold immediately. Singapore can be credited
with undertaking several proactive enterprises in response to the Lloyd’s declaration of
the Straits as a war-zone. Without delay, this small nation linked up their three nautical
agencies via a Maritime Security Task Force, placed tracking devices on private yachts
and smaller vessels (as a protection measure), and adopted standards of the International
Maritime Organization (IMO), specifically the International Ship Port Security (ISPS)
code. In August 2005, Singapore hosted an international forum that embraced President
Bush’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
For Malaysia, Bradford notes this country transitioned from treating piracy and
threats of maritime terrorism as a traditionally low national priority to prioritizing these
missions as a focal subject.29 Malaysia created the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement
Agency (MMEA), the equivalent of a nationalized Coast Guard. The MMEA was
essentially a littoral counter-terrorism initiative because it represented the presence of
smaller, faster vessels reliant on law enforcement authority. This was a different tactical
capability in the near shore environment than purely relying on a Navy that uses slower
29John F. Bradford, “Shifting the Tides against Piracy in Southeast Asian Waters” Asian Survey, (2008): Vol.
48, No. 3 (May/June), p. 478, 481
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warships and military rules of engagement. To address the full expanse of the Malaccan
Straits, the trilateral nations combined to form the Malaccan Sea Patrols. This was a
noteworthy trilateral effort on behalf of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia to cover the
entirety of this waterway, although the pact came with one major jurisdictional issue that
will be discussed shortly. While the Sea Patrols had actually been established since 2004,
the major upgrade to the Sea Patrols occurred a year later with the addition of “Eyes in
the Sky.”30 This program incorporated flights from all three nations’ aircraft to conduct
surveillance and reconnaissance in the Straits.
In 2006, the Malaccan Strait Patrols (MSP) program debuted, representing a
collaborative effort amongst the littorals to link air and sea patrols together more
meaningfully than the precursor Malaccan Sea Patrols. MSP (code named MALSINDO)
is a prime example of 3 nations working together to not only achieve sea/air coordination,
but also to identify practices that were not working and then adapt to improve the
process. While most academics agree MALSINDO has shown excellent results
eliminating piracy, there are critics. Roach, for example disagrees, stating “unfortunately
the patrols appear to have had little success.”31
Here to Help
Khalid emphasizes that because the three nations of Malaysia, Singapore and
Indonesia are termed littoral states, there is a frequent misconception these nations are all
aligned in their views on the Malaccan Straits. For Singapore, the Straits are the
30 Ibid., p. 482. Bradford states the “Eyes in the Sky” program got off to a rough start. Aircraft could not
convey information rapidly enough to surface patrol craft to take prompt action against suspect piracy
vessels and the aviation units’ tasking was not distributed equitably between the involved nations.
31 J. A. Roach, “Enhancing Maritime Security In The Straits of Malacca And Singapore”, Journal of
International Affairs 59 (1) (Fall 2005): p. 108
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economic lifeblood of their small nation, for Malaysia they are a key trade route, and for
Indonesia, the Straits primarily represent an issue of sovereignty. Khalid points out these
nations are aligned however in their approach to foreign assistance; they do not envision
the answer to issues of piracy or terrorism comes in the form of U.S. intervention.32 The
challenge with consulting these littoral nations is an assisting country must factor in
‘sovereignty’, a notion which is endemic to the political landscape of the region,
particularly for Indonesia and Malaysia. Bradford notes that two excellent Japanese
concepts, “Ocean Peace-Keeping” and a “Regional Coast Guard” died on the drawing
table, as Japan did not factor in sovereignty of the states they intended to aid.
It should be noted that based on its size, Singapore is not as adamant regarding
strict loyalty to their maritime borders as Indonesia and Malaysia; Singapore is a long-
standing partner to many nations and one of the first countries to have joined the U.S. in
the Global War on Terror. Singapore’s role in combatting regional terrorism, including
the Strait of Malacca, cannot be underscored enough. Singapore is an important U.S. ally
both economically for American Multi-National Companies (MNC’s) and as a logistical
port for the US Navy. In a broader spectrum, Singapore is also a close partner with
Australia and Japan. Tan cites the true trilateral relationship in this region may better be
defined as Singapore-U.S.-Australia, based on a broad swath of economic and military
32 Nazery Khalid, “With A Little Help from My Friends: Maritime capacity-building measures in the Straits
of Malacca”, Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs (2009): 31 (3)
(12): p. 425.
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support initiatives.33 In addition, these countries share a consolidated apprehension
regarding the rising naval presence of India and China in the Indian Ocean and Straits.34
Regionally, Singapore is a vocal leader within the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN). This role proved vital in the years following 9/11 when Singapore
brought Indonesia and Malaysia into the ASEAN fold, especially once Indonesia saw the
reality of Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorism following J.I.’s Bali bombings of 2002 and 2005.
More broadly, Singapore’s partnership with its neighboring states helped alleviate
Indonesian and Malaysian anti-U.S. sentiments; Singapore focused on coalescing positive
counter-terrorism initiatives such as the Malaccan Strait Patrols. As Tan paraphrases,
“Malaysia has been very aware of the terrorist threat, and has moved proactively to work
with Singapore on exploring other measures to improve maritime security.”35
The littoral states have all benefited from receiving counter-terrorism financing
through their ASEAN memberships. Of note, the ASEAN+3 member-countries of Japan
and South Korea have made generous financial contributions; the Strait is vital to the
economic lifeblood of these nations. As a stakeholder in the Straits of Malacca, 60% of
Japan’s economic trade flows through this waterway, which includes 90% of Japanese oil
imports. The reliance on the Straits has made Japan a vocal consultant and financier of
littoral counter-terrorism initiatives.
For the most part though, piracy and potential for burgeoning maritime terrorism
has been reduced through the littoral nations’ strong internal partnership efforts or
33Australia allows Singapore to train extensively on their soil as well.
34Andrew T.H. Tan, “Singapore’s Cooperation with the Trilateral Security Dialogue Partners in the War
Against Global Terrorism” Defence Studies, (2007): Vol. 7, No. 2 (June), p. 196-204
35 Ibid, p. 199
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“maritime capacity-building measures”, as Khalid terms this coordination. Nincic
disagrees with Bradford and Khalid’s emphasis on the successful collaboration to date
between the littoral nations, stating “the maritime security regime response is still little
more than a collection of at best bilaterally coordinated policy responses loosely
organized under the (ISPS) code.”36 In fairness, Nincic’s view in 2005 predated an
opportunity for these littoral states’ maritime counter-terrorism measures to be field-
tested and eventually, to become well established.  For the most part, the maritime
capacity building measures have been successful, as illustrated by the decline in piracy
and several notable terrorist events (ashore) that were thwarted since collaboration began.
This is not to say that all international efforts to assist with stifling piracy and
inhibiting the Straits from becoming a spawning ground for maritime terrorism have been
abandoned.  For example, the concept of ReCAAP (Regional Cooperation Agreement on
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia) is a groundbreaking effort.
Originally conceived by Japan in 2001 and later formalized in 2006, ReCAAP receives
reports, analyzes information, collates existing intelligence and operationally coordinates
through a fusion center to have nations take action, including arrests.  Kim states
ReCAAP “is the first multilateral framework specifically designed to enhance maritime
security and combat piracy and armed robbery in Asia.”37
Self-Imposed Boundaries
Malaysia and Indonesia send representatives to ReCAAP meetings, but are not
considered formal members. Unlu points out these nations request the intelligence offered
36 Donna J. Nincic, “The Challenge of Maritime Terrorism: Threat identification, WMD and Regime
Response”, Journal of Strategic Studies, (2005): 28:4, p. 619-644
37 Suk Kyoon Kim, “Maritime Security Initiatives in East Asia: Assessment and the Way Forward”, Ocean
Development & International Law (2011): 42 (3) (Jul), p. 230
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by the ReCAAP38 Information Sharing Center, but remain adamant that other nations’
vessels cannot cross over Indonesian/Malaysian territorial boundaries. This has serious
ramifications for Indonesia and Malaysia when hot pursuit issues arise. Hot pursuit
involves gaining consent from an adjacent nation to cross into their territorial seas. This
prohibition is well known by pirates who exploit the seams, knowing they can commit a
crime in Malaysian waters and then flee to Indonesian waters (or vice versa) since “hot
pursuit” prevents law enforcement from crossing borders and the adjacent nation cannot
prosecute a crime committed outside their seas.
As another example of the type of challenge created by sovereign limitations in
the Straits of Malacca, Admiral Fargo’s Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI)
was met with strong Malaysian and Indonesian resistance in 2005, when the U.S. Navy
suggested assigning forces to the region to help combat piracy. As Mr. Razak, Malaysia’s
former Deputy Prime Minister, stated, “Let me reiterate Malaysia's position that
safeguarding the Straits is a primary responsibility of the littoral states.”39 Rosenberg and
Chung point out Malaysia’s public-address was not singularly pointed at the U.S. There
are other nations such as China and India40, who have vested interests in the region and
possess well-developed Navies that could easily establish long-term presence in the
Straits, if allowed or requested.
38Dr. Nihan Ünlü, “Current Legal Developments: Straits of Malacca, Protecting the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore against Piracy and Terrorism” International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2006): Vol. 21,
No 4, p. 540
39Dato' Sri Mohd Najib Tun Haji Abd Razak. “Enhancing Maritime Security Cooperation”, Military
Technology 12/2005
40 David Rosenberg and Christopher Chung. “Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Coordinating
Coastal and User State Priorities” Ocean Development & International Law, (2008): 39: 51–68
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In a promising gesture, Australia breached the sovereign-hurdle of the trilateral
nations who have opted to address piracy and maritime terrorism alone, by requesting to
participate in the “Eyes in the Sky” program. In time, Australia’s full-fledged
contribution may allow other nations to help the littoral countries meet the operational
demands of sustaining routine aerial surveillance. Raymond notes that the “Eye in the
Sky” program now also allows trilateral aircraft to cross into each other’s airspace41 by
including conditions that sponsor representative riders in each other’s aircraft.
Technically, this arrangement allows planes to cross over lines of sovereign airspace
since adjacent nations’ representatives are on board.
Soft Power and Hard Power Approaches
Aljunied illustrates that within Indonesia, there are two primary Muslim
organizations, Muhammadiyyah and Nahdatul Ulama,42 which spiritually guide 50
million people in this nation. Indonesia has collaborated with these two groups to form a
united front for the Global War on Terror. The support from these associations is
essential to Indonesia’s goal of stopping maritime terrorism from ever developing. By
espousing zero tolerance for terrorism, these two moderate Muslim organizations play a
significant role as a pulpit for millions of supporters. The Indonesian style of including
religious leadership in state-policy represents a soft-power approach deemed critical to
limiting the growth of maritime terrorism in the littoral Straits.43
41Catherine, Raymond. “Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait”, Naval War College Review
(2009): 62 (3) (Summer): p. 38
42 Syed Mohammed Ad'ha Aljunied. “Countering Terrorism in Maritime Southeast Asia: Soft and Hard
Power Approaches”, Journal of Asian and African Studies, (2012): p. 657
43 Recall the earlier discussion on how Indonesia assists some of their outlying, poverty stricken areas,
which could theoretically otherwise become black holes.
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Singapore has taken a different approach to nipping maritime terrorism in the bud.
Through their expanded use of the Internal Security Act (ISA), Singapore can detain
suspected terrorists without trial.44 In tandem with Singapore’s complete support for the
U.S. Global War on Terrorism, this nation has cultivated a fear amongst its population,
not only of terrorism, but of even being associated with terrorism. Malaysia has adopted a
similar approach. In one instance, Malaysia arrested 70 members of J.I., dealing a
crippling blow to maritime terrorism using the ISA as a counter-terrorism policy
sledgehammer. Malaysia also suppressed the rise of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party
(PAS), a radical Muslim opposition party that showed propensity for violence and
potential as a maritime terrorist threat. Aljunied states in one instance, Malaysia stemmed
PAS’ anti-U.S. declarations by “unconditionally”45 detaining their leadership. In another
example, the nation even changed the national Islamic-based educational curriculum,
instructing Malaysian children that terrorist views would not be tolerated.
Narrowing the Playing Field
As stated earlier, 50,000-60,000 vessels transit the Malaccan Straits annually.
Bateman, Ho and Mathai also cite a 2006 Japanese study of all vessels using the Straits as
numbering 93,755 vessels (above 100 gross tons).46 This is an enormous number of
vessels to track and the study includes coastal trade and cross-Strait commerce (rather
than transiting through the Strait); it is these smaller near-coastal boats that are often
frequented for attack.  Bateman and cohorts describe there are essentially three qualities
44Aljunied, “Countering Terrorism in Maritime Southeast Asia: Soft and Hard Power Approaches”, Journal
of Asian and African Studies, (2012): p. 659
45 Ibid., p. 662-663
46 Sam Bateman, Joshua Ho, and Mathew Mathai. “Shipping patterns in the Malacca and Singapore
Straits: An Assessment of the Risks to Different Types of Vessels”, Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal
of International & Strategic Affairs 29 (2007): (2) (08), p. 326.
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that make a vessel vulnerable to piracy and potentially theft of the vessel itself. These
attributes are: height of the freeboard (distance from lowest deck to the waterline), speed
of the vessel, and number of crew onboard.47 With over 32,000 fishing vessels operating
from Malaysia, and a similar number from Indonesia, as well as thousands of tug boats,
this creates an immense challenge for authorities. Fortunately, the ReCAAP Information
Sharing Center (ISC) and the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Center
track statistics on the types and number of vessels being targeted. For ISC, this
information is updated constantly. Attacks are profiled as piracy, armed robbery, or petty
theft events. Mariners can be advised and trilateral patrols can be adjusted based on this
information. In fact, the ISC (and its counter-part, the Information Fusion Center) have
created a handbook48 for tug-boat operators since tugs are among the highest number of
attacked vessels.  Included in the handbook are details on how to report an incident of
piracy or armed robbery, protect a vessel from attack and even guidelines on planning a
safe passage through the Strait.
In addition to information partnerships, the trilateral nations have been receptive
to accommodating stricter interpretations of ship and port security in the post-9/11 era.
This includes the introduction of International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) regulations
which derive from the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the UN Body for
international shipping. Gunasekaran states, “The Malaysian government took seriously
47 Ibid., p. 327. Note: the number of crew onboard can be estimated by pirates based on size of vessel and
nature of work they are performing (i.e. fishing, tug/barge, transporting cargo)
48 ReCAAP, Information Sharing Center Tug Boats and Barges (TaB) Guide
http://www.recaap.org/AlertsReports/IncidentReports.aspx Accessed March 28, 2014
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the requirement to implement the ISPS Code.”49 Gunasekaran’s explanation is telling.
Although Malaysia discounted any maritime threats within its borders, this nation wanted
to proudly demonstrate they abided international IMO regulations as seriously as all other
maritime nations. In addition, “Malaysia [wanted] to demonstrate its determination to
defend its security from any form of infringement.”50 In other words, part of Malaysia’s
rationale for incorporating rigorous maritime security protocols was to impress upon the
United States (a major drafter and proponent of the ISPS code) that Malaysia would
address piracy and signs of maritime-terrorism on its own. As seen, this viewpoint
epitomizes the security posture of the littoral states; these nations will defend safe
passage through their waters as strongly as they protect their sovereignty.
Analysis
The Chapter initially asked whether piracy is still a concern in the Straits of
Malacca and whether maritime terrorism is, or has been, a cause for worry. When
examining statistical data over the last few years, piracy shows decline in the Strait. IMB
data revealed zero piracy attacks in 2011. In looking to expert opinions on maritime
terrorism, such as Chalk and Murphy, maritime terrorism appears unlikely to become an
issue in the littoral states based on insufficiency of highly specialized nautical skill sets
and the expenses of purchasing and maintaining boats. In terms of creating a terrorist
event that justifies the risk and costly preparations, experts say there is too small a public
audience at sea to witness a spectacular attack. Further, Raymond, Ong and Ho have
respectively collected historical data that show land-based attacks should merit the bulk
49 Periasamy Gunasekaran. “Malaysian Port Security: Issues and Challenges”, Australian Journal of
Maritime & Ocean Affairs (Australian Association for Maritime Affairs Incorporated), (2012): Vol. 4 Issue 2
(June), p. 60-63
50 Ibid., p. 63
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of anti-terrorism effort and resources. After all, 98% of recorded terrorism has occurred
on land over the last 30 years. In the Strait of Malacca, piracy has dwindled and maritime
terrorism is a rarity. While it might appear the threat is minimal, this is exactly why this
subject compels further examination. A false sense of security makes a fertile opportunity
for piracy or terrorism to emerge.
Getting Past the Numbers
From 2009 to 2013, something unusual happened. For Indonesia, piracy trends
appeared to start reversing. Piracy increased nearly 700% over pre-2009 levels.51 The
International Chamber of Commerce, for example, reported through 2014, Indonesia
experienced 68 low-level piracy attacks. At first glance, Indonesia’s 700% increase
seems an overwhelming number. It is not until one recognizes that pre-2009 piracy
occurred with single-digit annual frequency that the 700% can be viewed in better
perspective. For example, the article on current Indonesia piracy addresses global piracy
statistics and is actually titled “Piracy at Sea Falls to Lowest Level in Seven Years.”52
While these numbers sound alarming, these attacks did not occur in the Strait and were
primarily against vessels at anchor. Moreover, the attacks were generally conducted by
amateur knife-wielding thugs.  A 700% increase in piracy attacks is therefore a bit
misleading when viewed as an insulated statistic. In fact, there are other misleading
piracy statistics. One could conclude that Ho, Ong and Raymond’s miniscule statistics on
the small percentage of ships attacked in the world’s busiest Strait infer piracy is
51 Allianz Global Corporate and Specialty (2014) “Shipping losses decline, but emerging risks pose serious
challenges to marine industry and insurers”,
http://www.agcs.allianz.com/about-us/news/shipping-review-2014/ Accessed March 21, 2014
52 International Chamber of Commerce (17OCT2013) “Piracy at Sea Falls to Lowest Level in Seven Years”,
ICC Commercial Crime Services http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/873-piracy-at-sea-falls-to-lowest-level-in-
seven-years-reports-imb Accessed April 1, 2014
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irrelevant. Conversely, although maritime terrorism is a low-probability, high
consequence event, a similar argument prior to this Century can be made regarding
aviation-related terrorism. By peeling back a layer on piracy statistics, this brings up the
first valuable point when considering piracy in the littoral states. Piracy data should not
be trivialized or conversely, over-sensationalized. Instead, it is important to emphasize
what may be causing fluctuations in piracy, as seen recently in Indonesia.
For Indonesia, I suggest one of two piracy trends may be taking place. Piracy may
simply be getting reported more accurately. If so, an increasing trend in Indonesian
piracy supports Bradford’s theory on the danger of underreporting piracy. Bradford
suggested that pirates may have learned in years past to exploit underreporting by
limiting their threshold of violence to low-level assaults in which piracy is often
unreported. The result of underreporting has been that criminals become invisible to law-
makers, who believe piracy has waned, then decreasing patrols. When reporting is
encouraged, a 700% increase in piracy may more accurately be indicating a 700%
increase in the reporting of piracy. Second, the pirates may be adapting to Indonesian
deterrence and detection mechanisms, and learning how to circumvent anti-piracy
measures. The more promising answer is that piracy-reporting has improved. The other
alternative is piracy may actually be getting worse in Indonesia. It is hard to tell which
factor, or both, is at work. Based on statistics alone, a 700% increase in piracy is an
arbitrary number until the underlying variables that cause piracy statistics to rise or fall
are better comprehended.
A shift in how piracy-statistics are viewed may also compel a comparable shift in
how piracy relates to maritime terrorism. For instance, Banlaoi infers there is a danger in
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law enforcement and military forces becoming conditioned to piracy. As illustration, if
U.S. fishing vessels were attacked 68 times by marauding criminals armed with
machetes, there would be a startled, national response to this trend of unprecedented
assault and the possibility of terrorism on U.S. soil would not be excluded. For the littoral
states, piracy however has become part of the cost of business when conducting trade in a
marine environment. For this reason, I would contend that spikes in (non-injurious)
piracy may actually be a positive trend. Amplifying levels of piracy compel authorities to
re-examine anti-piracy protocols, which in turn means more patrols, increased
collaboration and less complacency in the maritime environment, thus reducing prospects
for terrorism to propagate.
In addition, Banlaoi also warned of the “blurred” line between piracy and
maritime terrorism. Investigating reported incidents of piracy also compels state-
authorities to investigate evidence of emerging maritime terrorism. In this sense,
increased piracy statistics, even by increased reporting, tend to sustain initiatives that lead
to multi-year declines in piracy. Piracy, after all may be amateur thugs seeking a quick
marginal profit, or increased piracy could be the flailing attempt of a weakened maritime
terrorist organization (i.e. Abu Sayyaf, Jemaah Islamiyah) to finance their maritime
attack plans, which as Murphy stated, is expensive.
Soft-Power: a Long-Term Necessity
In addition to the hard science of evaluating what piracy statistics are telling us,
there is a social aspect to evaluating how piracy and terrorism can intertwine, if allowed.
In this regard, the role of a soft-power approach cannot be overestimated. In response to
the “black holes” mentioned by Murphy, Ho states that one of the practices being
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employed to reduce black-holes from emerging is Indonesia’s appeal to their far-removed
pockets of coastal villagers who need help in overcoming desperate levels of poverty.
Comparable to Afghanistan, this type of soft-power approach persuades loyalties through
a provision of food and necessary goods. Since black-holes can be considered the
maritime equivalent of Afghani caves, there is triple value in establishing a relationship
between state authorities and remote villagers. If piracy is considered a crime-for-profit,
then state sponsored assistance provides the commodities which piracy would otherwise
purchase, such as food. Additionally, by establishing outreach to black-hole communities,
the littoral nations (specifically Indonesia and Malaysia) gain access to remote areas
where their humanitarian-aid presence deters maritime terrorism from sprouting in the
form of training camps and land-based staging for terrorism.
Lastly, as Aljunied points out, by relying on soft-power cooperation with
moderate Muslim leadership, Malaysia and Indonesia capitalized the power of their
religious leadership in signalling state-sponsored messaging to the masses. For Indonesia
and Malaysia, the reality is local government can be corrupt and state government may be
inaccessible. By relying on clerical leaders, these states have channeled communication
with their populations through the voice of respected, judicious Muslim organizations
who help avert maritime terrorism from forming within, or along their borders.
Dollars and Sense
As Chalk alluded, both piracy and maritime terrorism can impact regional and
global supply chains. Piracy can frustrate the flow of cargo by slowing down a ship. This
in turn, can slow subsequent ships transiting through the Strait of Malacca who then need
to adjust speed to maintain a safe following-distance. Although the impediment to
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commerce may be fairly negligible in this case, the impact to “Just enough- Just in Time”
cargo flow is largely a by-product of the pirates’ criminality, rather than a consciously-
sought outcome. For maritime terrorists, disrupting “Just enough- Just in time” may be a
very conscious tactic. Impacting, or impeding the Strait of Malacca (if possible) has the
potential to tip global cargo economies off-kilter. In this regard, the distinction between
maritime terrorism and piracy may be the difference between terrorists who intentionally
seek an economic impact as opposed to pirates who may unintentionally affect
economies. Either way, the ripple of both piracy and terrorism touches world supply
chains, shipping industry and insurers, port scheduling, vessels at anchorage, shore-side
trucking, wholesale and retail markets, and ultimately consumer pricing.
As mentioned previously, the majority of piracy impacts smaller vessels transiting
the Straits. These include fishing vessels and tug-boats. Bateman, et al. cites that while
barge cargo is typically worthless for re-sale (gravel can sell for $9/ton as compared with
$20K/ton for electronics carried on a cargo-ship), the tug or barge itself still has value.
Tugs are an especially enticing target, considering the ease in which pirates can steal an
entire tug, re-paint and then employ the tug elsewhere. Tugs and their barges are far
slower than a cargo ship, are less maneuverable, require a handful of crewmembers
(typically Indonesian), and have a very low freeboard, making them easy to board. They
are in other words, nearly an ideal target. ReCAAP/ISC’s Tug Boat and Barges Guide
(TAB) Against Piracy and Sea Robbery is a well-organized handbook, designed to help
protect tugs and barges. In this Chapter’s context, the TAB is something more than a
manual. The TAB represents information being shared not only among littoral
governments, but through data provided by SE Asian (ReCAAP/ISC) and international
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tracking mechanisms (IMB). Most valuably, the TAB handbook represents information-
sharing between the government(s) and tug operators. The trilateral nations have
employed the abilities of their collaborative Information Sharing Center (ISC) to strip out
some of the most pertinent data points underscoring piracy statistics. In this case, ISC
evaluated piracy-reports, and determined tugs were being targeted in certain locales. The
littoral nations then devised outreach to this community of mariners, helping tug
operators to help themselves. By reducing not only piracy, but thefts of entire tugs (which
can be loaded with explosives and are also difficult to stop), this initiative reduces the
threat of maritime terrorism. In many ways, this success story epitomizes the arguments
being illustrated throughout this Chapter.
Tugs are not the only vessels that can be repainted and operated again under new
ownership. Nincic points out that Al Qaeda has expressed resolve to purchase small
ships; this transportation mode would magnify the ability to transport resources and
expand their global reach. If Al Qaeda can afford to properly document a vessel, they can
also register a ship under a number of available flag-states and routinely sail through the
Straits as shipping traffic. Through this tactic, maritime terrorism in the littoral states’
region could arrive in the form of legitimate shipping. If properly documented, Al Qaeda
vessels would be allowed innocent passage through the Straits. This includes carrying
any number of cargoes through the most narrow chokepoint areas within the Strait of
Malacca. This problem is bigger than the littoral states can address themselves; this is an
issue for the International Maritime Organization and International Maritime Bureau.
Nonetheless, even suggestion of the Al Qaeda fleet bearing association with the world’s
most utilized waterway is a topic worthy of mention. The notion infers Al Qaeda vessels
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may be allowed safe transit through the Straits under corporate-shell ownership and their
flags of convenience. In addition, an Al Qaeda owned or operated vessel would not fit
neatly under any category of crime or maritime terrorism, posing all the more threat to
global shipping through a legitimized concealment of their true identity and purpose.
Sovereignty: an Integral Measure
This Chapter cannot conclude an evaluation of piracy and terrorism issues in the
Straits of Malacca without re-emphasizing the importance of sovereignty in this region.
Finding ways to ease littoral sovereignty concerns is a step in the right direction for any
nation supporting anti-piracy or anti-terrorism initiatives. As observed, the concept of
each littoral nation hosting multi-national observers on “Eye in the Sky” flights seems to
have eased tensions regarding sovereign issues with airspace. In time, this success-to-date
may lead these trilateral states to embrace increased compromise with sea-level
enterprises, particularly if surface vessels are eventually allowed to engage “hot-pursuit”
measures across territorial boundaries. As can be seen with Admiral Fargo’s best
intentions for the Regional Maritime Security Initiative, American efforts, especially in
the U.S. “shift to the Pacific” must tread lightly. Assisting the littoral-states is likely to be
best served in the form of financial assistance, rather than deploying an unwanted carrier
group to the region. As Japan learned in the 2000’s, even good regional security ideas
should be provided to these nations upon request, or through diplomatically-arranged
offers such as U.S. willingness to engage in multi-lateral training exercises.
Singapore remains an important player in the delicate balance of SE Asian
sovereignty. Singapore has been dually pivotal in creating meaningful security measures
alongside Malaysia and Indonesia while arbitrating U.S., Japanese and Australian
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regional economic and military interests. In fact, the leadership of Singapore, Australia
and Japan has been instrumental in the Straits as a form of protection for US interests. To
explain, by predominantly relying on ASEAN and Japanese/Australian initiatives, U.S.
Navy presence in the Straits has been restricted. The omission of a U.S. presence has
actually limited anti-American sentiments from becoming rampant (and limited
opportunity as well for radicalized Islamic elements to develop). The Straits are essential
to both American shipping and US-bound global shipping. The fact Singapore can broker
key alliances in the littoral nations and referee Japanese/Australian/U.S. agendas offers a
vital service to each partner. To an extent, as Gunasekaran demonstrates, the littoral
nations have alternatively found ways to patrol and protect their own waters. For
example, Malaysia made international maritime security a national priority, while still
abiding international maritime security standards such as the U.N.’s International Ship
and Port Security (ISPS) Code. In particular, Indonesia and Malaysia’s fierce
independence have ensured adherence to rigorous maritime security standards (like
ISPS), while Singapore has served a vital role mediating on behalf of its neighbors and
interceding when first-world powers offer assistance that may be viewed by Indonesia
and Malaysia as intrusive.
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Conclusion
Piracy and maritime terrorism share a common battle space. This does not assume
terrorists select identical targets, answer to similar leadership, or exploit the ocean for the
same causative rationale as pirates. By the same token, nothing suggests terrorists do not
do these things. The littoral states have experienced incidents of piracy and terrorism.
The borders of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia all lay within proximity of another,
making it impossible to say with certainty that piracy and terrorism are unrelated. In
addition to sharing the waters of the Malaccan Strait, pirates and terrorists share other
commonalities. They both seek finances to stay functional, require training, select vessels
as targets and share common opposition to law enforcement. That said, the Chapter’s first
question asked- Are vessels in the Strait of Malacca safe from piracy? The answer
depends largely on what type of boat you are using, its speed, crew, maneuverability,
freeboard, and the waters in which you are sailing. Fishing boats and tugs sailing at night
along coastal Indonesia present a greater vulnerability to attack than say, a large crude
carrier being closely monitored by Vessel Traffic and transiting in daylight. In general,
the studies conclude that larger vessels that do not stop to anchor or idle dockside have
predominantly been safe over the last eight to nine years. Smaller vessels tend to under-
report and typically support a family, rather than national cargo or fuel needs. In a
strategic context, global shipping can accordingly be considered as generally safe from
Straits of Malacca piracy. Regional fishermen and near-coastal trade (tugs, barges, and
scows) however are not considered safe from piracy.
Is the Strait safe from maritime terrorism? The answer to this question is more
complex. Initiatives that address piracy inevitably deter maritime terrorism, or certainly
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give terrorists pause before attacking in waters being patrolled and observed by three
nations. Maritime terrorism data is scarce and involves complex political agendas. For
example, an essential component to keeping maritime terrorism threats low is keeping
anti-Western sentiments equally low in the region. As referenced, trilateral coordination,
sovereignty, Singapore’s relationship with the U.S. and reliance on powerful, moderate
Muslim organizations all play a role in keeping America an ally. Terrorists do not need
additional reason to substantiate jihad. Acronymically, ASEAN, IMO and IMB, and
ReCAAP also support collaboration, regulation and information-sharing as anti-terrorism
measures. De-stabilizing J.I. leadership and eradicating black-hole opportunities have
contributed to squashing terrorism from developing. As a testament to many initiatives
that began in 2004-2005, the littoral nations and the Strait emerged unscathed from the
2009 Al Qaeda communique encouraging jihadists to embrace maritime terrorism. While
no region should ever declare itself terrorism-proof, the Straits’ safety supports the
hypothesis that the Straits of Malacca can be declared safe from piracy and terrorism.
This leads to the Chapter’s latter question. Were the littoral SE Asian nations able
to overcome underlying challenges in their collaborative effort to reduce threats of
piracy and terrorism in the Strait of Malacca? First, these nations have shown that
multiple geo-political, cultural and sovereign challenges related to counter-piracy and
counter-terrorism can be overcome. These challenges have been offset by a variety of
state-led practices that collectively provide some worthy lessons learned. Singapore’s
hardline approach to prosecuting criminals, Indonesia’s soft-power cooperation with
moderate Muslim leaders, multi-state reliance on ReCAAP, ICC and IMB piracy reports,
maintaining Eye in the Sky type-patrols and encouraging tug operators to adopt vigilant
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standards have all been part of the answer. The larger takeaway from these trilateral
nations in having overcome counter-piracy challenges is that a variety of security options
helps avoid complacency and keeps piracy & terrorism off-balance.
It is important to not overestimate the recent infrequency of piracy in the Straits
and maritime terrorism in the region. Statistically, 9/11 can be considered an anomaly if
evaluating U.S.-based aviation terrorism as a data set. Nevertheless, airport security
measures would not be curtailed simply due to the infrequency in which planes fly into
buildings. The same philosophy must adhere to shipping that passes through the world’s
most strategically valuable economic chokepoint. Attacks on the M/V Limburg and USS
Cole illustrate the level of damage that even small boats, as pirates tend to favor, can
cause when ramming larger vessels. Neither frequency of attack nor delivery methods
should be underestimated in a target-rich maritime zone such as the Straits of Malacca.
The most unforeseen finding in this study is the role sovereignty plays in SE
Asian maritime security. The littoral nations of Indonesia and Malaysia view their
territorial waters as physical extensions of nationalized pride. In terms of piracy,
sovereignty remains a challenge as long as criminals are able to exploit boundary-lines.
In light of this vulnerability, the littoral nations will need to consistently accommodate
sovereignty by devising methods that prevent pirates and future terrorists from using
territorial seams as a source of operative advantage. Piracy may be waning regionally and
maritime terrorism may be globally infrequent, yet a collaborative regional effort remains
essential to countering piracy and terrorism. The collaborative model for the Straits of
Malacca needs to dovetail innovative solutions, make prudent use of available resources,




This Chapter asks the question - when does offshore piracy present a maritime
risk to the United States? The subject of African piracy has been previously explored, but
this Chapter scrutinizes aspects of offshore piracy that would compel the U.S. to
transition from an observer-role to that of a regional participant. While Somalian piracy
has not been eradicated, offshore crime levels are a fraction of that seen just two years
ago. Contrarily, as of this writing, trends of Gulf piracy occur with a higher frequency
and present the more significant threat of African piracy. Thus, this Chapter focuses on
West Africa, particularly Nigeria. The variables will be confined to examining where
offshore piracy has afflicted Nigeria and other nations within the Gulf of Guinea. The
purpose here is to typify features of offshore piracy53 and then determine which of these
attributes present greatest concern to the U.S.
This Chapter conducts a brief comparison of Gulf and Somali pirates to
emphasize similarities and distinctions in what drives East vs. West Africans towards
piracy. The idea is to initially determine whether offshore piracy emerges from
comparable factors and then develops over time as a similar crime pattern. If so, counter-
piracy has recently proven successful in Somalia. Can the same strategy apply to the Gulf
of Guinea? Setting aside geo-political aspects, counter-piracy initiatives also need to
consider the nature of the people involved. Just as counter-terrorism experts would
53 It is important to distinguish first where piracy occurs, since location plays a role. The emphasis is on
offshore piracy, a crime that takes place greater than 12 miles offshore according to international
maritime standards.  Within 12 miles, the same crime is construed to occur within a nation’s waters and is
labeled armed robbery. Unlike piracy, armed robbery typically falls under jurisdiction of the state claiming
sovereignty of their territorial seas. This distinction will surface throughout this paper.
45
approach Palestinian terrorists differently than Al Qaeda, the differences between East
and West African piracy command distinctive policymaking considerations.
In brief, the Chapter progresses through a review of two piracy-related variables
that will help build a base layer for a cohesive analysis. The first variable is embedded in
the literature review. This is the question of who these pirates are. Before assessing any
methodology on how to stop piracy, it is valuable to understand what makes them start.
Pirates’ origins are integral to their attraction to this way of life. By association,
evaluating those motivations therefore factors into when offshore pirates pose a threat to
U.S. interests.
The next variable is addressing which facets of African piracy are potential threats
to the U.S.  Before the Chapter can distinguish the likely effect of potential threats, it is
important to understand what these offshore piracy-related threats are. Several issues may
induce the U.S. to respond to offshore piracy. The first is examining the economic threat
from piracy. Gulf of Guinea nations may be compelled to diminish exports and
potentially see their political stability affected as a result. The next is piracy impacting
multi-national corporations (MNC’s), several of which are U.S.-based companies with
U.S.-citizens as employees. Third, is economic effect on worldwide shipping, including
vessel flag-states and underwriters. The next group of potential threats from offshore
piracy is energy stability. This includes impact to U.S., EU and Central African nations’
imports. Fifth and last, is viewing the category of threats associated with piracy-related
violence. This includes hijacking-kidnappings and murdering the crew. Piracy violence
would oblige important considerations such as whether the victims were Nigerian, U.S.
citizens, or foreign nationals. If foreign, are those who are kidnapped or killed from U.S.
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allies? Are the U.S. or West African nations able to reason with these offshore pirates,
can they be recidivated, or do they need to be targeted as stateless enemies, i.e. ISIL or
the Taliban?
This Chapter crafts a snapshot of people, politics and economic factors that will
help shape a final assessment of when offshore piracy can be expected to affect U.S.
security concerns. The Chapter uses two primary categories. The first assesses attributes
that are people-related, examining the pirates themselves through a literature review. The
second category targets larger macro-political concerns through a case study. This
combination is designed to help narrow down what kinds of offshore piracy tipping
points may threaten the U.S. In short, is it the people who present the offshore piracy
threat, the impact they have, or some combination of both?
My initial hypothesis was that the U.S. would engage naval resources or
maritime-related policies in the Gulf region only if Nigerian oil interests were threatened.
Specifically, this hypothesis stemmed from the preliminary thought that prompted this
Chapter - What if offshore piracy actually compels the U.S. to rebalance its’ overall
energy portfolio? What the Chapter revealed however, is that U.S.-Nigerian energy
investments do not seem to be a primary causal factor as to when offshore piracy
threatens the U.S. Instead, it finds that other less-apparent attributes of offshore piracy
may threaten the U.S. more into considering deployments or instituting policy changes.
These characteristics will have a focus.
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Literature Review
To begin an exploration as to whether offshore piracy suggests maritime security
concerns for the U.S., it is important to first examine the Gulf pirates themselves. Are
these individuals’ ragtag bandits, insurgents aimed at financing a revolution, budding
terrorists, or something else entirely? This literature review will narrow down who is
committing Gulf piracy.
Who Becomes a Gulf Pirate?
The ease in which Gulf piracy is carried out has brought Western Africa to a level
meriting worldwide attention. Pirates have exploited coastal and offshore environments,
legal loopholes, and distinctions in territorial waters. So, who are these Gulf of Guinea
pirates? It would be easy to dismiss them as simply exploiting maritime targets via a
regional criminal network. Yet, for many Gulf pirates, there is an ideological aspect that
traces to Nigeria’s checkered ascension as an oil state.
Over the last 60 years, Nigeria’s partnership with international petroleum
corporations has shaped Nigerian youth to become resentful of perceptions of corporate
intrusion and governmental neglect. For starters, the majority of Nigerian citizens have
not benefited from oil. Particularly for Nigerians local to the Delta region, Murphy
describes this pervasive belief as “gaining nothing from the billions of dollars paid for oil
extracted from beneath their feet.”54 The people of the Delta are generally categorized as
poor, and at the mercy of stronger Nigerian ethnic clans who control employment
prospects. Murphy contends that petro-rich tribes often have access to political positions
where they gain favor from offshore mega-deals and use political appointments to secure
54 Martin N. Murphy, "Petro-Piracy: Oil and Troubled Waters," Foreign Policy Research Institute 57, No. 3
(2013), p. 425
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kickbacks associated from bunkering, a term that describes illegal syphoning from the
national oil pipeline. Retired Ambassador Cohen suggests that as an additional factor, the
1999 restructure of Nigeria’s constitution helped propel impoverished Nigerians towards
oil theft. Specifically, Cohen points out more than 50% of oil revenue were reallocated
between 36 Nigerian States, with the coastal states receiving double shares. At first
glance this seems like a positive transition. However, in concurrence with Murphy’s
assessment, Cohen states this profit sharing only amplified that the “people of the Delta
(were) earning no benefits in terms of roads, electricity, schools, and clinics despite the
extra revenue.”55 The Ambassador takes position instead, that the misallocated shares left
an increasingly disgruntled Delta population to dwell in poverty and live in a landscape
decimated by oil spills and slicks.
Driven to sea
In fact, due to the environmental ruin of the Delta, the Gulf fishing industry was
also devastated. Since Nigeria gained independence from Britain in 1960 (oil was
discovered in 1956), and became established as a petro-state, Murphy emphasizes the
extent of ruin as “millions (of) tons of oil have spilt; this equates to an Exxon Valdez
disaster every year.”56 One of the impacts of this environmental scourge has been
depleting a near-coastal fishing industry. This has produced unemployed fishermen who
then seek outlets to supplant their deprived livelihood. Their maritime skills often make
them, and their children, well-qualified for piracy.
As alluded to, the success of pirates in targeting vessels offshore is born from an
aptitude for stealing oil in the Nigerian Delta from the Trans-Niger pipeline.
55 Herman Cohen, Nigeria: A well-oiled Federation. Journal of International Peace Operations (2008), p.
31-2.
56 Murphy, "Petro-Piracy: Oil and Troubled Waters", p. 425
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Predominantly over the last eight years, Kashubsky’s data on piracy trends indicates
these criminals have simply evolved shallow water bunkering tactics to meet the oceanic
environment.57 The addition of transiting tankers in Nigerian territorial waters, Gulf
offshore oil exploration, and using tributaries of the Delta to move stolen oil by barge for
a secondary resale market all make the region increasingly lucrative for pirates.
The government has shown some culpability regarding their role in
environmentally destroying the Delta region. In agreement, both Murphy and Aiyetan
describe this recompense took the form of what can be described as a 2009 Nigerian
amnesty program that paid 26,000 militant Delta youths to essentially cease their criminal
behavior.58 For a short time, the program seemed promising, including the Movement for
the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)’s pledge to observe a conditional truce.
However, the peace was short-lived. The pirates re-organized under new gang nom de
plumes, including the Niger Delta Vigilantes and the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer
Force (NDPVF). These criminal syndicates moved their criminal actions offshore,
finding tankers and in recent years, targeting offshore oil platforms.
Getting an early start
More than simply being poor Nigerians, Aiyetan suggests the Gulf pirates are
largely comprised of youths, many in their teens. His first-hand insights59 reveal this
stems from a Nigerian practice in the early 2000’s in which local politicians, using oil-
based fortunes, often hired Delta youths as strong-arm support for their budding
57 Mikhail Kashubsky, A Chronology of Attacks on and Unlawful Interferences with, Offshore Oil and Gas
Installations, 1975–2010. Perspectives on Terrorism 5 (2011): 5-6.
58 Murphy, “Petro-Piracy” p. 426, and Dayo Aiyetan, "Outgunned," New Internationalist, No. 465 (2013):
26
59 Aiyetan, “Outgunned”, p. 26
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campaigns. Once re-elected, Aiyetan reasons these politicians abandoned the youths,
leaving a generation of armed and resentful Delta youth to organize as gangs. These
groundswell criminal syndicates found a common ideology and modus operandi,
targeting oil workers for kidnappings and stealing Nigerian oil through illegal bunkering
of shore-based pipelines60.
Socio-culturally, there are attributes of the Nigerian youth being attracted to
piracy worthy of discussion. For one, children and young men who adopt a mindset that
advocates piracy are likely to embrace and foster piracy for decades until arrested,
reeducated or eradicated. Second, youth pirates represent an immature, suggestible and
invincible group of pirates, a dangerous combination. Ukiwo points out many of these
youths are of the Ijaw tribe, who having become frustrated with their elders in the 1980’s,
formed gangs that adopted cultural beliefs in mystical abilities, such as Feibagha Ogbo
(immunity to death) and Adelegba Ogbo (resistant to harm from bullets).61
Drumbl states that a third of the captured West African pirates are minors. Pirates
can claim this status if caught, meaning their sentencing will be less severe; in some cases
they are released outright. In addition, these minors often live in the Delta. In a region
decimated by oil, few work prospects exist for children.62 Drumbl illustrates the Nigerian
child pirates are typically perceived to be on either ends of the spectrum, being observed
as “faultless passive victims—abducted, helpless, and forced into criminal activities—or,
60 Ibid., p. 26-27
61 Ukoha Ukiwo, “From ‘Pirates’ to ‘Militants’: A Historical Perspective on Anti-State and Anti-oil
Company Mobilization among the Ijaw of Warri, Western Niger Delta”, African Affairs, (2007),106/425:
590, 601
62 Mark A. Drumbl, “Child Pirates: Rehabilitation, Reintegration, and Accountability”, Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law, 46, no. 1 (Fall 2013). 235-248
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as incorrigible demons.”63 He argues that many child pirates are typically ‘tricked’ into
becoming pirates by adolescent role models or choose piracy of their own volition, often
against the wishes of parents or tribal elders. Further, Drumbl states that based on impact
to crews and cargo, “child piracy, to be clear, affects Western interests.”64
In her separate assessment on child piracy, Whitman deduces young pirates are a
mechanism for wealthy pirate gang leaders to circumvent legal loopholes, such as U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Paris Principles, two judicial bodies which
favor treating children as exploited child-soldiers rather than criminals.65 Whitman
extends Drumbl’s argument that socio-political factors created Nigerian youth piracy.
She comments that “it has become recognized in Nigeria that social mobility and the
struggle for survival now necessitate the use of violence as society gradually stopped
recognizing merit and force became a plausible avenue to the top of the social and
economic strata.”66 In this framework, according to Whitman, child pirates can be
construed as victims of child labor abuse by the International Labor Organization. Her
argument suggests that international advocates for children’s rights can actually provide
Nigerian juvenile pirates with a convenient ‘cover’, should the young pirates be captured.
Whitman terms this loophole as “catch and release.” This ambiguity in the Nigerian legal
system can be exploited as a clever ruse to avoid prison time. In the case of young pirates
working as indentured crew on pirate vessels, children can be caught and then released
directly back to their captors. In both cases, the Nigerian judicial system is primed for
failure. “Catch and release” propagates recidivism, child exploitation and a vicious cycle.
63 Ibid., 265-268
64 Ibid., p. 269
65 Shelly L. Whitman, “Children and Maritime Piracy,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law,
46, no. 1 (Fall 2013): 219-222
66 Ibid., p. 225, 233
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Somalian Piracy Origins and Somali Child Pirates
As a comparison, Somalia’s piracy does not trace to natural abundances of oil or
governmental issues of bribes and kickbacks at the expense of a population, as befell
Nigeria. Instead, in the absence of a functional Somalian government over the last 23
years, academics point to a variety of other explanations for this nation’s piracy. Murphy
claims Somalian fishermen under direction of local warlords committed piracy against
other countrymen hired to protect foreign vessels fishing in Somali waters.67 In addition,
Murphy’s research indicates that also in the 1990’s, Puntland, one of the wealthier
regions, hired a private British company to help establish a fledgling Somalian Coast
Guard. When this initiative failed, the prospective Guardsmen, now well-versed in
navigation, formed the original cadre of pirates. Unlike Nigeria, these pirates have
primarily kidnapped and ransomed crew members for profit. The emphasis on achieving
payment for the sailors, rather than the cargo, is an important distinction. Somali pirates
assign more value to the crews’ lives as a commodity, as opposed to the Nigerian pirates
who see the crew as an obstruction to syphoning fuel for market re-sale. Like Nigeria,
both pirates rely on mother ships to extend their offshore reach.
In contrast to Murphy’s findings, Weir cites two other causal factors for the rise
of Somalian piracy. The departure of the UN Peacekeeping Force and naval forces in the
mid-1990’s coincided with complete governmental collapse. Seeing an opportunity,
pirates began taking advantage of both near-coastal trade routes as well as the historical
67 Martin N. Murphy, “Security Responses to Piracy in Southeast Asia, West Africa and Somalia," Emirates
Lecture Series, no. 111 (12, 2013): 4
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sea-lanes to the Gulf of Aden located farther offshore.68 Similar to Murphy, Weir cites
fishing as having direct linkage to Somali piracy. However, rather than protecting foreign
fishing at a protection-fee, Weir states the local fishermen resented the large trawlers who
arrived in Somali waters and hauled out massive catches, following Somalia’s
governmental collapse. Rather than being paid by these foreigners to protect their fishing
interests, Weir emphasizes the Somali clans assumed form as an informal Coast Guard,
charging ‘licenses’ to fish and demanding extra payment from uncooperative foreigners.
As far as the types of Somali recruits, Percy and Shortland describe the dynamic
of Somalian piracy as “organized - not opportunistic”69, drawing comparisons to mafia
hierarchies that establish a structure for long-term corruption rather than random crime.
Organized and opportunistic are terms to be described in more detail shortly, as they are
frequently mentioned in describing both Gulf and Somali pirates. Percy and Shortland
also refer to Somalian pirates as having the following general qualities: innovation,
patience, and a reliance on adhering to an established code-of-conduct in which pirates do
not generally rob or kill one another. According to Percy and Shortland, this last attribute
of Somali pirates resembles a cultural value found in advanced organized crime
syndicates. Similar to Nigerian piracy, the “victims are not members of the
community.”70 Also similar to Nigeria, Hansen contends that Somali piracy does not
68 Gary Weir, Chapter 13 of Piracy and Maritime Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies, edited by
Bruce Elleman, Andrew Forbes, and David Rosenberg, Naval War College Press, (2010) Newport Paper 35:
5-7
69 Sarah Percy & Anja Shortland, The Business of Piracy in Somalia, Journal of Strategic Studies, 36:4
(2013): 535-558
70 Ibid., p. 560
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thrive in chaos. Instead, Somalian piracy “emerges in regions where there was a
semblance of stability, ideally where governing institutions were weak.”71
In regards to Somali children being attracted to piracy, Drumbl and Whitman’s
theories apply largely to Nigeria and Somalia. Drumbl’s research has shown that for
Somali youth, roughly thirty percent of captured pirates are poor, illiterate youth. To
complicate matters, Drumbl argues Somalia does not have a system for birth certificates.
This has implications for processing Somalis in an international tribunal if they are
caught offshore. Whitman adds that Somali youth have widely available access to light
weapons and often come from families where piracy is a livelihood.72 This is a distinction
from Nigerian tribes where tribal elders often frown upon the practice. In addition,
Somalia has a strong presence of Al Shabab which poses worry when considering the
blurred lines between piracy and terrorism. Whitman accentuates Somalia also has vast
minors from which to recruit. Over 50% of the nation’s entire population is under 18
years old. In a country where children voluntarily flock to piracy, Whitman states it is
“essential that we find mechanisms and solutions to interrupt the cycle of recruitment.”73
Finally, Gjelsvik and Bjorgo conducted interviews with 16 former Somali pirates.
Their research determined the youth often felt obliged to remain pirates, as the social ties
from piracy were strong and leaving the pirate gangs made “being accepted back into the
society difficult due to stigma and social rejection.”74 In addition, Gjelsvik and Bjorgo
discovered an interesting finding amongst recidivated Somali pirates; the economic allure
71 Stig Jarle Hansen, "The Dynamics of Somali Piracy," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35, no. 7 (Jul, 2012):
523-530
72 Whitman, “Children and Marine Piracy”, p. 220-221
73 Ibid., p. 220-229
74 Ingvild Gjelsvik, Ingvild Magnæs Gjelsvik and Tore Bjørgo, "Ex-Pirates in Somalia: Processes of
Engagement, Disengagement, and Reintegration," Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology & Crime
Prevention 13, no. 2 (12, 2012): 94-114.
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of piracy was dominant enough to overcome the taboo of piracy, a practice that is
forbidden according to Islam.
Rationalizing piracy
There are two dominant theories regarding the rise of the Gulf gangs into violent
organizations such as MEND or NDPVF, the groups affiliated with pipeline attacks and
Gulf piracy. The first subscribes to Paul Collier’s concept that pirate gangs, both
Somalian and Nigerian, tend to profit “not because of the existence of historical and
social grievance but because of the opportunities available for them to do well out of
war.”75 Collier is suggesting poverty and suppression create an excuse or window for
criminal prospects. The second idea argues the opposite; greed is not a central motive.
Ukiwo believes “conflicts in Africa are generally rooted in perceptions of political and
economic marginalization, social exclusion, and crises of identity and citizenship.”76
Ukiwo’s opinion applies to Somali and Nigerian pirates. In addition to greed and dogma,
there is another component still missing as explanation. Oil plundering in the Gulf
undoubtedly has aspects of greed and social identity as motivators; but there may be
another facet. Pirates in both regions might be considering their actions justifiable in the
absence of other prospects for legitimate incomes. In other words, had regional oil been
equitably distributed in the first place; there may have been no widespread impulse for
piracy in the Gulf, nor a black market for oil. For Somalis, the government has provided
nothing; gangs and Al Shabab created the opportunities. In fact, the research suggests the
75 Paul Collier,“Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective” in M. Berdal and, D. Malone (eds. Greed
and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO) (2000): 91–112.
76 Ukiwo, “From ‘Pirates’ to ‘Militants’: A Historical Perspective on Anti-State and Anti-oil Company
Mobilization among the Ijaw of Warri, Western Niger Delta” (2007): 590
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very term opportunists may aptly be the incentive that brings both Somali and Gulf youth
to pursue the risk and reward of becoming a pirate.
Opportunity - A third theory
The notion of Gulf pirates as opportunists surfaces in several journals. Dunn
argues that Nigerian pirates are typically dock workers, maritime security employees or
fishermen who retain access to opportunities in the form of vessels, information (i.e. ship
arrivals) or commodities (such as oil).77 Further, Dunn postures that opportunists exploit
in-port situations where ships are minimally manned or constrained in navigation, i.e.
vulnerable to piracy. She considers pirates to be judged as either opportunists or
organized, the latter being a term which implies structure and leadership.
Dunn also cites Gottschalk and Flanagan’s definition of pirate opportunity as
situations that present “ample targets worth the risk, (offer) acceptable risk of likely
detection; and (include) a safe haven in close proximity for support.”78 In nearly lockstep
agreement on the terms opportunist and organized regarding piracy, Tepp describes
organized pirates as having the distinction of being “well-funded gangs that carry out
attacks against vessels on the high seas as well as in territorial waters, (with) modern
weapons, speed boats, advanced means of communications and boarding equipment.”79
Samatar, Linberg and Mahayni make a different distinction between categorizing
the opportunity for Gulf pirates. Their terminology describes pirates in two categories: “a
legitimate resistance of local population to the predation of the state and oil companies; -
and- criminal entrepreneurial elements which recognize that fortunes could be made from
77 LCDR Halle Dunn, Oil Pirates of the Niger Delta JCSP 35, Canadian Forces College, (date unk.): 24
78 Ibid., P. 31
79 Tepp, Eero. The Gulf of Guinea: Military and Non-Military Ways of Combatting Piracy. Baltic Security &
Defence Review 14 (1) (01) (2012): 187
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piracy.”80 In essence, Samatar and cohorts delineate ideology and greed as the major
opportunities for offshore piracy.
Finally, in a milestone study on the subject of stolen Nigerian oil, Katsouris and
Sayne also cite the term opportunists. They label all participants as involved with
Nigerian oil theft, to include land-based criminals and pirates. The distinction they make
is labeling pirates as high-level or low-level opportunists.81 High-level comprises a status-
based control of oil theft operations through godfather-type tribal leaders and government
bureaucrats. Low-level includes the influence of local, youth gangs. In comparison with
Somali warlords who hire young gangs to commit offshore piracy on their behalf, this
description aptly fits both Somalian and Gulf piracy.
In all, the research on piracy affords various definitions of opportunity. The term
opportunist appears prevalently in Eastern and Western African piracy. This literature
review has melded various interpretations of piracy opportunity. While each academic
profile offers a contribution in defining the term, the idea is that opportunity for youth to
seek offshore piracy as a livelihood offers more prospects than greed or profit. There is
opportunity to legitimize a cause and promote within a gang hierarchy. In addition, there
is opportunity for Gulf pirates to exploit their knowledge of tanker routes/scheduling,
naval patrols, shipboard weaknesses, Delta tributaries, and a secondary oil market. For
Nigerian pirates, opportunity in all these forms may be a sufficient motivator for piracy.
When all other prospects for a legitimate livelihood are absent, Gulf pirates have limited
opportunity for alternatives, regardless of the degree of profit, risk, or legality involved.
80 Abdi Ismail Samatar, Mark Lindberg, Basil Mahayni. The Dialectics of Piracy in Somalia: the Rich versus
the Poor Third World Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 8 (2010): 1380
81 Christina Katsouris and Aaron Sayne, Nigeria’s Criminal Crude: International Options to Combat the
Export of  Stolen Oil, Chatham House (2013): 6-7
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Hypothesis
My hypothesis is that offshore piracy can compel U.S. involvement when certain
American interests are threatened. Specifically, these interests include situations in which
piracy threatens a balanced national energy portfolio, requires U.S. protection of
shipping/oil platforms that support national energy needs, or when piracy endangers U.S.
citizens deployed or employed in the region. The rationale is that innately, threats to
national interests will trump individual-based threats, such as kidnapping. While threats
to the national energy supply would potentially elicit lower media attraction than U.S.
citizens being kidnapped by pirates, energy has more significance at the function-of-
government level. In addition, the hypothesis suggests the U.S. values importing
premium, foreign oil from other (non-North American) markets beyond the Middle East.
The hypothesis also suggests that the U.S. will be prompted to consider modifying
protocols or deploying naval forces only when both the actual pirates (as discussed in the
literature review) and the extent of their influence (discussed next in the case study)
threaten the U.S. In other words, the personal qualities of the pirates and their impact
make a difference. For example, aggressive, young and opportunistic pirates in the Gulf
region may be more of a pressing concern than Somalian pirates who rely on prolonged
negotiations and ransoming crew for profit. Using this logic, Nigerian pirates can threaten
American oil interests as well as U.S. citizens working in the region. In Somalia, oil
tankers are not syphoned or stolen and the crew’s value relies on being kept alive as a
bartering commodity. In situations such as the Gulf of Guinea, the hypothesis suggests
both energy needs and U.S. citizens may be threatened by offshore piracy.
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Methodology
The insights on who becomes an offshore (Gulf or Somali) pirate are useful to
understanding the ground-level motivations behind offshore piracy.  Pirates, as discussed
in the literature review are not universal. In fact, Nigerian pirates appear to threaten both
energy demands (through theft) and crew safety (through murder) more than Somalian
counterparts. These qualities imply an increased level of personal danger in the Gulf of
Guinea, both to those working in these waters and from those committing piracy. This
hazard is compounded by the limited timeframe in which the U.S. can respond based on
the hit and run nature of Gulf piracy. To complement these initial findings, the Chapter
next uses a case study examining conditions when offshore piracy might most alarm the
U.S. The conclusion merges the socio-based results derived from the literature review
with strategic perspective offered by the case study to define when the U.S. is sufficiently
concerned to become involved with offshore piracy.
The Chapter incorporates a case study that researches two conditions. First, does
offshore piracy in the Gulf of Guinea engender a risk to U.S. security interests?82 This
will be done by integrating findings within the analysis section. These components
include a socio-cultural assessment of offshore piracy, based on the literature review, and
an effects-based evaluation of offshore piracy, as embodied by a case study. Second, by
combining findings from a top-down case study and a bottom-up literature review, the
analysis will expectedly be better balanced and hence, more objective in determining
instances when offshore piracy presents a threat to the U.S.
82 As discussed, the Gulf of Guinea presents the current ‘hot-spot’ for offshore African piracy. As of this
writing, the Gulf offers greatest utility in examining a location for offshore piracy that has not yet been
regionally eradicated or assisted by international resources or coalition task forces.
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Case Study
The case study examines several potential sources of impact to the U.S. from
offshore piracy. Using a focus on the Gulf of Guinea, a region that touches multiple
nations’ shores, piracy has mainly impacted four countries in general: Nigeria, Benin,
Togo and Ghana. The emphasis of Gulf pirate attacks to date has been on Nigeria. It is
important to clarify from the onset that there are two different, but related crimes
occurring in Nigeria on a routine basis. The first is shore-based oil theft and the second is
piracy. Although the focus here is offshore piracy, it is important to distinguish between
the two. To put oil theft ashore in perspective, Thinnes states that in the first quarter of
2013 alone, Nigerian oil theft accounted for a 5% loss in total revenue or nearly 100,000
stolen barrels of oil daily.83 Another 2013 estimate quoted even higher figures. Nigeria’s
President cited losses of $1 billion a month, which equate to 300-400,000 barrels a day,
or 10% of Nigeria’s annual oil production.84 Offshore piracy contributes to these losses,
but as evidenced by disparity in these two estimates, it is difficult to calculate how much
oil is being stolen due to inconsistent reporting, corruption, and re-distribution of oil on a
secondary resale market. While the focus here is on impacts from offshore piracy,
Nigeria is clearly facing challenges to theft within the petro-industry, on land and at sea.
Corporate Profits
Having clarified the magnitude of oil theft ashore, but recognizing the focus here
is impacts from offshore piracy, the first concern is assessing the hypothesis that U.S.
policymakers would consider regional action should piracy threaten a balanced national
83 Billy Thinnes, "Impact," Hydrocarbon Processing 92, no. 11 (11, 2013), 9-12
84 John Vidal, £1 Billion a Month: the Spiraling Cost of Oil Theft in Nigeria The Observer, 05OCT2013
accessed October 1, 2014 from http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/oct/06/oil-theft-
costs-nigeria
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energy portfolio. The data from U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA) reports indicates
the United States imported 9 to 11% of its’ foreign oil from Nigeria in 2002-2011.85 As
of 2013 data, imports had reduced drastically to 4%, meaning Nigeria slid from the fifth
highest source of U.S. petroleum imports to eighth. This slip is an economic indicator of
instability in the Niger Delta and emerging offshore vulnerabilities. Yet, in mining this
data, two verities come to light. For one, the U.S. simply adjusted its’ foreign energy
portfolio. Second, the decreased Nigerian exports have not impacted Nigerian production.
In fact, Nigeria incentivizes deep-water drilling, where offshore piracy occurs. MNC’s
continue to invest offshore as Nigeria rewards exploratory oil wells based on a depth
ratio; the deeper the water, the higher the company profit margin. In other words, the U.S.
has backed away from Gulf imports while MNC’s have been increasingly enticed to
pursue offshore production further from shore. In contrast to decreasing U.S. reliance on
Gulf oil, EIA reports Nigerian production in 2011 was 2.13 million barrels/day (bbl/d)86;
this is an increase of .08 million/bbd over the year prior.  Based on this Energy
Information Administration data, the U.S. is down-sizing dependence on Nigerian oil
while MNC production continues to grow.
Marketwise, the U.S. and Nigeria stand to benefit from a Gulf-reliant U.S. oil
portfolio, since Nigerian oil is high quality, and low in sulfur content.87 Analysts predict
that from 2012-2019, the top seven largest oil producing nations in the Gulf will
collectively generate $350 billion in oil revenue.88 Investors, in the form of MNC’s have
85 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Nigeria Analysis, 30DEC2013
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=NI (accessed October 1, 2014)
86 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Nigeria Analysis, Production, 2013
87 Damian Ondo Mañe. Emergence of the Gulf of Guinea in the Global Economy: Prospects and
Challenges International Monetary Fund Working Paper, (2005) WP/05/235, p. 5
88 Ibid., p. 15
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recognized the potential growth in this market, particularly Shell, Exxon-Mobil, Chevron
and Total, who communally have nine offshore platforms, slated for nearly 1million bbl/d
production by 2016.89
Harm to Shipping
In contrast to this offshore growth, experts estimate the cost of piracy to oil
investors and shippers’ costs over $2 billion each year, based on theft alone.90 Insurance
premiums also continue to surge for oil tankers transiting the region and major oil
companies building offshore oil platforms. In 2005, Lloyds of London had seen sufficient
insurance claims from Somali-related piracy to re-define how they treated piracy. Instead
of viewing acts of piracy as matters related to the ship’s hull, Lloyds revised acts of
piracy against insured ships, labeling these incidents as “war-risk” insurance.91 Lloyds
has changed the way piracy is viewed by the insurance industry. Losses of entire ships
and thousands of barrels in oil cargo make this an unprecedented financial issue for
global investors. While the costs of these insurance premiums are likely to be absorbed
by consumers, this factor in itself is unlikely to threaten the U.S.
Hurting the Neighbors
Aside from the knowable costs, there are also inferred losses. These are instances
where the extent of damage may not yet be calculable. For example, the nation of Benin,
Nigeria’s adjacent westerly neighbor, has already felt economic losses in revenue based
on oil-related piracy. A nation that derives 80% of its revenue from oil, Benin cannot
89 EIA, Upcoming Oil Projects in Nigeria, 16OCT2012, revised 30EC2013
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=NI (accessed October 2, 2014)
90 Scott Baldauf. Next Pirate Hot Spot: the Gulf of Guinea, Christian Science Monitor, February 28 2012.
91 Llewellyn D. Howell, Pirates: Scourge of the Modern Seas, USA Today Magazine 134, no. 2732 (05,
2006): 18
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afford impacts to their primary export. Whereas a well-established oil nation such as
Nigeria may be able to weather the repercussions of a petro-industry rife with piracy and
allegations of corruption, Benin will likely not survive as a regional oil producer if piracy
frightens off investors. To support this deduction, in the last few years, Benin’s major
port city, Cotonou, has seen a 70% drop in port calls, based on Gulf of Guinea piracy.92
Should a promising nation like Benin falter, this would be an unanticipated global
consequence of Gulf piracy in terms of impact to U.S. security interests. Instead of a
rising West African power, the U.S. would then need to contend with a failing state in a
region where crime and terrorism have been insidious when given the chance.
Allies and emerging African nations
As U.S. imports from Nigeria have declined, the European Union (EU) has
increased their share. EU now imports 40% of their oil from the region.93 In addition,
Central African nations have developing energy and financial investments in the Gulf.
This dynamic reached a zenith in 2013 when the Economic Community of Central
African States (ECCAS) joined the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) in a landmark meeting to
address the effects of piracy on oil prices to their emerging nations.94 Oil is essential to
economic growth and piracy slows down production capacity, increases import rates and
can create friction, if unresolved, between ECCAS and ECOWAS.
The U.S. can diminish its’ own reliance on Nigerian imports based on security
concerns, but there are foreign relations concerns that still make the Gulf a significant
92 Ibid., p. 18
93 Staff Article, Gulf of Guinea, New Danger Zone, New African (526) (2013): 10-14
94 Adjoa Anyimadu, The Gulf of Guinea: Lessons Learned from the Indian Ocean, Chatham House, Africa
(2013): 2
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factor for U.S. international relations. In short, this predominantly includes consideration
of EU reliance on Nigerian oil imports. The Central African states may not represent the
coalition alliances the U.S. has established with the European nations, but offshore piracy
nonetheless has potential to impact continental enterprises (EU, ECCAS, and ECOWAS)
that rely on uninterrupted Gulf oil imports. Although not a direct threat, this dynamic can
affect U.S. interests.
A difference in tactics
Anyimadu has found 2 main piracy patterns tend to occur when pirates board oil
tankers offshore.95 First, Gulf-based pirates often violently seize the cargo. This is a stark
contrast from Somalian practices. Kidnapping personnel is commonplace, although Gulf
kidnappings occur with lower frequency than Somalia piracy and are kept for days
instead of weeks or months. Gulf pirates tend to treat victims poorly. Unlike Somalia,
where the personnel are ransomed, Nigerian pirates view the crew as an obstruction to
stealing the oil. Secondly, the Gulf pirates have become adept at seizing oil cargo and
syphoning to another vessel. As an industry practice, this is termed ship-to-ship transfers.
Navies and tankers lightering oil routinely conduct these transfers legitimately.
Anyimadu has found that skilled pirates can also run through the same oil transfer
evolution with minimal delay. The Gulf patterns have potential to raise U.S. concerns.
Offshore piracy in this region is violent, and U.S. citizens who encounter Gulf pirates
have a higher likelihood (than Somalian piracy) of being killed.
95 Ibid., 4-17
65
Offshore Piracy, by the Numbers
In 2012, the Gulf of Guinea experienced 58 cases of piracy. Of these, 27 acts of
piracy occurred in Nigerian waters. This number represents a threefold Nigerian increase
over the previous year. Further, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) cited 11 attacks
off coastal Nigeria in the first quarter of 2013.96 This pattern signifies a nearly fivefold
increase in piracy attacks compared with 2011. The numbers of piracy attacks against
shipping however is slippery. For a variety of reasons, piracy against vessels in the Gulf
region may be underreported by as much as 50-80%. In the recorded data collected for all
offshore attacks against oil and gas facilities, several Nigerian patterns emerge,
particularly for 2004-2010.97 Over the course of this period, Kashubsky identified 29
different piracy attacks that were directed at offshore platforms alone. These numbers are
telling. As discussed, offshore drilling structures represent the future of oil exploration in
the Gulf of Guinea as well the newest advances in oil production technology.
For the most part, offshore platform data however is not generally captured the
same way as shipping data, which is traditionally collected by the International Maritime
Organization (IMO). Piracy data is formally assembled by the International Maritime
Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center.98 Of the 29 attacks against offshore oil platforms
for example, MEND, a Nigerian political group, played a role in nearly all the incidents.
In addition to these 29 attacks, there was a higher incidence of murder offshore than
96 Cristina Barrios, Fighting Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, Offshore and Onshore, European Institute for
Security Studies, Brief-Issue 20, May (2013): 1-4
97 Mikhail Kashubsky, A Chronology of Attacks on and Unlawful Interferences with, Offshore Oil and Gas
Installations, 1975-2010 Perspectives on Terrorism 5, no. 5-6 (2011).
98 International Chamber of Commerce, 2014. International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Center
(IMB-PRC), Piracy & Armed Robbery News & Figures. Accessed October 3rd, 2014 from http://www.icc-
ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/piracynewsafigures
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attacks against general shipping, as well as a greater trend towards using explosives, and
aims to shut-down offshore facility production.
As comparison between Somalia and the Gulf of Guinea, Somalia experienced a
height of 237 piracy attacks in 2011 (a total of 15 were recorded in 2013) whereas the
Gulf experienced a height of 110 pirate attacks in 2013.99 This variance does not seem
significant enough to warrant coalition efforts in the Gulf such as CTF 151, the EU’s
Operation Atalanta, or NATO’s Operation Shield. Even more fitting a reason why
coalition navies would avoid deploying to the Gulf are the kidnapping statistics. At the
height of Somalia’s kidnappings, this crime occurred 1,016 times in 2010, compared with
32 kidnappings in 2013100, the worst year for the Gulf.  Somalia experienced 30 times the
number of kidnappings as the Gulf. For the U.S. and coalition partners, the Somalian
kidnappings justify naval deployments, whereas stolen oil in the Gulf has not engendered
the same type of coalition response.
Economics it seems is not the driving factor for when the U.S. is most threatened.
In fact, as the study has shown, the U.S. simply reduces Nigerian crude imports in
response to offshore piracy. For those who would argue that the U.S. might respond if
major U.S. owned oil corporations are threatened, this does not seem the case. For
example, although diminishing Gulf imports as a U.S. strategy also decreases MNC profit
margins, the U.S. reduced Nigerian imports 5% in the last year; this change created a
market loss for MNCs.
99 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Maritime Security: Ongoing U.S. Counter-piracy Efforts Would
Benefit From Agency Assessments, GAO-14-422: Published: Jun 19, 2014. Publicly Released: Jun 23, 2014.
Accessed October 7, 2014 from http://www.gao.gov/products/, p. 11, 46-47
100 Ibid, p. 15, 30
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Location, location, location
In reviewing this data, at least four of these offshore platforms were in deep-water
locations. IMB’s 2014 assessment in fact warns mariners that “attacks (have been)
reported 170 nautical miles (nm) from the coast. Pirates have hijacked vessels for several
days, ransacked and looted the crew and ship properties and stolen its cargo, usually gas
or oil. Crewmembers have been injured and kidnapped during the attacks. Generally, all
waters in Nigeria remain risky.”101 By comparison, using shipping-based statistics, the
IMO reported 554 attacks against vessels from 2003-2013.102 80% of these piracy attacks
on vessels occurred in states’ territorial waters (within 12nm), while 20% were in
international waters. These numbers are troubling in a couple of regards. Chris
Trelawney, the IMO Director for maritime security, cites that within 12(nm) of a nation’s
shore, piracy is technically considered armed robbery. Only when a vessel gets beyond
the nation’s territorial seas does an attack on a ship or offshore oil platform constitute
piracy.  For major oil companies, this could be an important distinction dependent on
where the oil fields are located and where drilling operations are being conducted in
relation to a nation’s territorial seas. The issue therefore draws less international attention
when the volume of offshore piracy is veiled under the guise of armed robbery. In
addition, the U.S. cannot respond to the 80% of these incidents without permission of the
coastal state in whose territorial seas they occur. Doing so would cause more grave
consequences for international relations than any damage caused by piracy itself. The
101 IMB-PRC, Piracy & Armed Robbery Prone Areas and Warnings Accessed October 3, 2014 from
http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/prone-areas-and-warnings
102 Chris Trelawny, Piracy in West Africa: A Symptom of Wider Problems? New African, No. 526 (2013): 16-
21
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implications of coastal-water attacks differ from the rules of intervention-at-sea (>12
nm), when piracy occurs on the high seas. The pirates know this distinction.
Another international legal aspect is United Nation Security Resolutions 2018
(2011) and 2039 (2012)103 that specifically address the Gulf of Guinea issue of offshore
piracy. While these initiatives emphasize regional security, they place a vested UN
interest in the Gulf, making it difficult for the U.S. to respond to piracy incidents without
first attaining UN approval.
Resource Limitations
Although at-sea piracy typically involves use of naval forces, rather than
traditional shore-based military and police, Gulf navy resources are limited. Nigeria
boasts the largest Gulf Navy, yet this includes one corvette and one fast frigate.104 Ghana
added six new offshore patrol vessels, but the odds are in the pirates’ favor; they can
choose to attack knowing limited navies cannot react in time. In some cases, as reported
through first-hand data collected by Kashubsky, pirates even brazenly attack the navy
boats. A speedboat attack near Port Harcourt, Nigeria, resulted in pirates killing nine
Nigerian sailors. In another pirate attack against the Shell Forcados terminal, a military
gunboat was shot and sunk with 25 military personnel onboard.105 Complicating the
inability of Gulf governments to halt piracy is a lack of organized Gulf state coast guards
becoming adept at the anti-piracy mission. As opposed to navies, Coast Guards rely on
smaller, faster patrol boats to aid in chase situations and shallower waters. In addition,
103 United Nations Security Council 2014, Security Council Resolutions, Accessed October 3rd 2014 from
http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/index.shtml
104 Staff Article, Gulf of Guinea, New Danger Zone, p. 12
105 Kashubsky, A Chronology of Attacks, Accessed September 30, 2014 from
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/offshore-gas-and-oil-attacks/html
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nations use coast guards to enforce their law enforcement authorities instead of relying
exclusively on naval rules of engagement, a system of regulations designed for combat.
For the U.S., offshore piracy has the potential to compel American involvement in
the absence of regional navies, but only if assistance is requested by Nigeria or
ECOWAS nations. The presence of armed U.S. gunships off several African coastlines
could create the likelihood of conflict and polarize anti-American sentiments should
military intervention lead to killing Nigerian youth pirates. As previously mentioned,
while offshore oil production attracts deep-water investors it also equates to American
MNCs who may be placing their employees and energy platforms in harm’s way. This
situation has potential to threaten the U.S. by compelling military action against violent,
young pirates should U.S. citizens be kidnapped or killed.
Harming the industries that support Gulf oil
A logistical impact from piracy is on the industries that support oil extraction in
the Gulf of Guinea. For instance, offshore supply vessels (OSV’s) provide a critical
linkage between shore-based necessities and the rigs; these 150-300 foot vessels are often
the lifeline for food, transport, cargo and technical necessities required to sustain the
offshore drilling platforms. OSV’s present a relatively easy target for pirates in two
regards. First, these vessels cannot keep up with the speed of pirate speedboats and their
freeboard (height from deck to water) makes them far easier to board at sea than an oil
tanker. Second, pirates who are privy to insider information can use an OSV to deliver
pirate crews to unwitting oil rig personnel on offshore platforms. Hijacked OSVs also
have the range to utilize deep-water mother ships as a staging platform, thus eluding
shore authorities by basing from sea. Lastly, OSV’s are often manned by multi-national
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crews, making kidnappings a complex political situation.106 The U.S. would likely not be
threatened by an OSV hijacking, but their extensive offshore range and linkage to
mother-ships would be a consideration if deploying future counter-piracy task forces.
Offshore rigs and uniquely designed floating platforms called Floating Production
Storage and Offloading (FPSO) units are also susceptible, stationary targets. These
platforms are attached to the ocean floor, operate offshore and are poorly designed to
repel attackers or provide workers with a defensible platform. These massive floating
installations have been attacked on at least five reported occasions from 2004-2010.107
FPSO Mystras has been subject to offshore piracy three times and FPSO Bonga was
subject to a MEND attack in 2008. Unlike ships transiting off Somalia, FPSO’s cannot
easily increase speed, change course, repel invaders or find a different route. The U.S.
would not feel directly threatened by piracy attack on an FPSO, although at an individual
cost of $700-800 million dollars108, destruction of these easy targets could alter global oil
prices. Second, the FPSO attaches to subsea wellheads. Hijacking an FPSO and tearing
an injection line to these wellheads could cause an environmental disaster.
Official U.S. Stance(s) on Gulf of Guinea Piracy
The formal U.S. position regarding offshore Gulf piracy is complicated. The
White House has implied their stance, the U.S. State Department has established an
economic working group, and the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has formally
106 Barbara Starr, Catherine E. Shoichet. 2 Seized in Pirate Attack off Nigeria, CNN (25OCT2013)
http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/24/world/africa/nigeria-vessel-attack/ (accessed October 2, 2014)
107 Kashubsky A Chronology of Attacks, Accessed October 4, 2014 from
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/offshore-gas-and-oil-attacks/html
108 FPSO World Fleet, FPSO Info. Accessed October 4, 2014 from http://www.fpso.net/page7.html
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defined their position on Gulf piracy. It is fitting to include consideration of these
variables in our discussion of when the U.S. may be threatened by Gulf piracy.
In 2012, the U.S. State Department established the Gulf of Guinea Working
Group (GoG) in coordination with commercial shipping representatives.109 The GoG was
deemed necessary by the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), a State Dept.
body that establishes public-private partnerships on a case-by-case basis. By creating the
GoG, the State Dept. insinuated that Gulf piracy had become sufficiently widespread to
require facilitating U.S. diplomacy on behalf of the U.S. energy sector.
Next, a comprehensive June 2014 Government Accountability Office (GAO)
study reported, “the U.S. has not assessed its efforts or the need for a collective plan to
address the evolving problem in the region.” In addition, “according to U.S. agencies
working in the region, the National Security Council (NSC) staff has not directed them to
collectively assess their efforts to address piracy and maritime crime.”110 This is a
significant, recent statement. The NSC is the national brokering house for issues of
national security. The GAO report provides data that further supports NSC’s
equivocation regarding offshore piracy as a security concern. Despite the gradual increase
in Gulf piracy from 2010 through 2013, U.S. counter-piracy funding has decreased from
$243 million in 2010 to $69 million in 2013.111
In contrast to the NSC position, there are other indicators that suggest offshore
piracy is still cause for U.S. concern at the senior operational level. For instance, as
109 Neptune Maritime Security 2013, U.S. State Department’s OSAC Reviews Gulf of Guinea Threats
Accessed October 7, 2014 from http://www.neptunemaritimesecurity.com/u-s-state-departments-osac-
reviews-gulf-of-guinea-threats/
110 Government Accountability Office (GAO-14-422), Ongoing U.S. Counter-piracy Efforts Would Benefit
From Agency Assessments, Published: Jun 19, 2014. Accessed October 7, 2014 from
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-422, Executive Summary
111 Ibid., p. 47, 51
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AFRICOM’s commanding officer, General Rodriguez stated in a March 2014 Hearing
before the House Armed Services Committee that “maritime criminal activities in the
Gulf of Guinea remain at concerning levels. Maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea
continues to negatively affect commerce, fisheries, the marine environment, food
security, oil distribution, and regional economic development.”112 General Rodriguez’s
messaging illuminates how offshore piracy is a complicated U.S. foreign policy subject.
There are inconsistencies in priority between the Executive Branch and the principal
DOD Combatant Commander on the same topic. Next, the analysis combines discussion
points from the case study and literature review, identifying the U.S. threats that appear
to be of most concern.
Analysis
The subject of this analysis Section is determining when offshore piracy threatens
U.S. security. Arguably, there are facets that have been discussed in terms of a pirate-
personality-type that make a compelling rationale for the U.S. to not engage in countering
these offshore pirates. Policymakers would be advised to heed distinctions between West
and East African pirates should U.S. naval forces need to deploy to either region. The
case study has already alluded to several of those reasons, summarized at the end of this
section. To address this over-arching question, it is critical to begin with a re-cap of who
commits piracy. Table 1 summarizes a number of piracy comparatives between Nigerians
and Somalis, based on the literature review. Items that are highlighted (and checked) are
factors more likely to threaten U.S. security.
112 General David M. Rodriguez, (US Army), Commander, United States Africa Command (AFRICOM)
before the House Armed Service Committee Posture Hearing, (5 MARCH 2014). Accessed October 7, 2014
from http://www.africom.mil/ p. 13
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Gulf of Guinea Pirates Somalian Pirates
Primarily youth Primarily youth
Operate near-shore and offshore Operate near-shore and offshore
Influence: MEND/NDPVF Influence: Warlords/Al Shabab
 Fishing livelihood impacted (oil) Livelihood impacted (foreign
fishing)
 Ideology/Profit as motives Profit/Ideology as motives
Political corruption-factor  Governmental absence-factor
 Reliance on Violence Reliance on Violence
Hijack and Syphon Hijack and Ransom
 Highly Opportunistic Region Highly Opportunistic Region
Table 1: Socio-Cultural Comparison of African Piracy
The qualities listed in the Table have been appropriated as the most principal
findings offered from the literature review. So what is Table 1 telling us about the
qualities of piracy in both regions that may threaten the U.S? Setting aside the even-
draws, there are two factors that indicate Somalian pirates are a threat to the U.S. The
first is the absence of a Somalian government. This suggests that while there may be no
working government, this also means coalition forces can arrive unopposed to enforce
counter-piracy operations, such as Command Task Force 151, NATO’s Operation Ocean
Shield and the EU-led Operation Atalanta.113 For Nigeria, despite corruption, their
government is still a working republic. This status includes retaining sovereign rights
113 J.Peter Pham, Beyond the Water’s Edge: Learning from the Somali Piracy Challenge Journal of
International Peace Operations Volume 6, Number 2 — September-October, (2010): 9
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over Nigerian territorial waters and resisting other warships from entering their waters.
With that in mind, keeping a coalition naval presence in Somalian waters endlessly is
unsustainable. Once patrolling forces depart Somalia, lawlessness will resume in the
absence of an institutional government. For this reason, Somalia’s absent political
situation represents a greater threat to the U.S. It is worth mention that hijacking and
ransoming crew may be equally dangerous to Nigeria’s hijacking and syphoning
operations. Killing crews in Nigeria is clearly violent, but Somali’s kidnapping of U.S.
crew would also demand a security response.
As Table 1 indicates, piracy in West Africa poses several threats to the United
States. For one, Nigeria’s Delta region is almost completely uninhabitable due to decades
of oil extraction and production. There is almost no opportunity for youth to pursue any
other livelihood in a region that has been rendered unfishable. This correlates with the
concept of a region that is opportunistic for piracy as few other Delta occupations can vie
with piracy as a source of livelihood. Somalia, by contrast, has not been decimated and
fishing is still a viable option.
Next, for Gulf pirates, Ideology/Profit is highlighted as a greater U.S. threat. This
estimation relies on the logic that unlike Somalia, the literature implies ideology is
considered the primary motivator for Gulf piracy. This does not indicate greed is not a
motive in the Delta. Rather, if ideology is the more prevalent motivator, then it is far
more difficult to dismantle a belief system than create alternatives to alleviate greed. In
the event the U.S. becomes engaged in the Gulf, changing these pirates’ belief system
will require a lasting and forceful commitment.
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Lastly, the literature review denotes Gulf pirates display an increased willingness
to use violence more willingly than Somali pirates. This violence is associated with two
main aspects. For one, Gulf pirates view their trade differently than Somalian
counterparts who can wait weeks or months to receive a ransom. Time is of the essence
in Nigeria. Piracy must be committed quickly before navy patrols can arrive on scene.
Since Gulf piracy equates to syphoning fuel, any resistance from the pirated crew slows
down a ship-to-ship fuel transfer. Second, crews on MNC-sponsored vessels represent the
enemy. Violence links back here to ideology. Piracy is a personal business in the Gulf,
carried out by adolescents against corporate entities who have perceivably depleted their
waters and fish stocks. This modus operandi should be considered threatening to anyone
operating in the region; these pirates are a group that should be avoided. There is little to
be gained for the U.S. by deploying to the Gulf to create an enemy of aggrieved youth
who commit piracy near-shore and offshore, and rely on violence to achieve objectives.
Case Study Highlights: Effects-Based
Table 2 (page 77) illustrates the relationship between major findings from the case
study. The further an issue migrates to the right of the Table, the more that issue might
threaten the U.S.  Table 2 is based on findings from this Chapter’s Data section. Starting
at the top of Table 2 and working downward through the list, the first issue that suggests
moderate concern/threat to the U.S. is economic impact to Gulf nations from piracy. EIA
data has shown despite decreased U.S. imports, Gulf States continue to export to EU and
other markets. Estimates for gross profits 2012-2019 are in the $350 billion range. Next,
can MNC economic impacts potentially threaten the U.S? Again, EU-based profits are
strong and decreased U.S. business has not diminished regional production. In fact,
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offshore exploration has increased. This second threat in the column is rated slightly
higher based on the potential for lost tax revenue if U.S.-owned MNCs bring less oil
revenue into the U.S. In terms of ‘Economic impact to shipping industry’, the impact
from piracy is shouldered by Lloyd’s and underwriters. Consumers, rather than the U.S.,
would be threatened by impact of piracy on shipping, as insurance premium surges would
be absorbed by gas station price spikes. Next, while Guilt by Association seems to be a
factor, as evidenced by Benin’s decrease in port calls, Benin is a member of ECOWAS;
profit sharing with countries like Nigeria will expectedly offset losses. The fifth threat on
the list is labeled EU energy impact. This was rated as a fairly high risk marker. If piracy
impacts EU oil imports, Europe may bolster Russian imports, making coalition sanctions
less effective and swelling Russian power.
Next, decreased Central African stability is also rated as a risk factor for U.S.
concern. Decreased oil flow from Western neighbors can create conflict, slow Central
African growth, and allow regime shapers (Al Shabab, Boko Haram) to benefit from
instability. The seventh item in the column is a Diversified U.S. energy portfolio, the
factor this Chapter originally suggested would predominate. The data however suggests
differently. U.S. imports of Gulf oil have decreased by nearly 70%; the U.S. has simply
adjusted. Finally, the last three boxes on the list advocate violence can influence petro-
related industries (OSV, FPSO) through use of kidnappings and murder. Yet, data from
Barrios, Kashubsky and IMB studies reveals these events have already occurred with
minimal U.S. response. Violence levels do suggest this can still be a risk factor for the
U.S.; there may be a future event involving deaths of U.S. citizens in which American
foreign-policy is unavoidable and a U.S. response becomes obligatory.
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Issue Matters less to U.S. Issue matters more to U.S.
Table 2: Weighted Emphasis on Security Issue(s) Importance to U.S.
Economic impact to Gulf Of Guinea nations
from lowered exports due to piracy
Economic impact to MNCs: corporate profits,
hiring private security, damage costs
‘Guilt by Association’ impact: Ghana, Togo,
Benin, and other West African states
Economic impact to shippers, insurers,
agents, Flag states from piracy
EU energy impact: leads to > reliance on
Russia for energy sourcing
Piracy compels U.S. to further diversify
energy portfolio or >U.S. production
Decreased Central African stability if <Gulf
oil production impacts ECOWAS/ECCAS
Kidnapping or murder of foreign national
crew (allies) following hijack of vessel
Kidnapping or murder of U.S. crew
following hijack of vessel
OSV, FPSO and offshore rig industries are





My initial hypothesis was that on a macro-level scale, the Gulf of Guinea will
compel varying degrees of U.S. involvement dependent upon which American interests
are threatened. This included U.S. energy needs, protection of shipping/oil platforms
supporting those energy needs, and endangerment of U.S. citizens in the region. In the
end, the original hypothesis was partially supported by data and available literature. The
findings diminish the significance of American reliance on Nigerian oil and the data
show offshore platforms have already been attacked with limited media coverage or U.S.
response. The conditions for kidnapping or murder of U.S. crew appear to have prospects
for an international incident. The literature review (and Table 1 summary) reveals a
dangerous Gulf pirate character-profile. Unlike Somalia, where kidnapped personnel
were generally treated favorably (since ransoms depended on returning the crew),
Nigerian piracy is typified by violence.
The range of academic sources has led me to consider who becomes a Gulf of
Guinea pirate and whether that character profile presents a risk to U.S. security interests.
The Gulf pirate is typically a socially aggrieved, young and unemployed fisherman
willing to exploit oil transfer opportunities at sea through gang-affiliated support and
marginal hesitation to use violence. The offshore pirate is often desperate and has little to
lose. They cannot easily be stopped, either individually or as a multi-generational
problem. They have killed Nigerian military, can evade international tribunals and
compel naval forces to potentially hesitate in combat situations. Coalition vessels would
be hampered in conducting any combat options beyond eradication. Naval patrols would
also be assigned primarily near West African territorial waters.
79
Unlike Somalia, territorial boundaries matter to Nigeria. The U.S. would be faced
with a crafty and dangerous adversary who knows how to exploit offshore and territorial
seas, as well as use Delta tributaries to re-sell oil. The U.S. would likely avoid placing
naval forces in the Gulf purely to protect commercial ventures from offshore pirates.
Another aspect of this Chapter’s revised hypothesis is the finding that based on
the fact nearly half of Europe’s oil comes from West Africa, the EU may eventually be
faced with a piracy situation that compels European engagement. Should NATO forces
be brought to bear, the situation may likely induce the U.S. to support its EU allies. In
addition, maintaining (or even increasing) EU dependence on Gulf oil is in the best
interests of the U.S. As Nigerian oil reliance grows, Russian oil exports diminish. For
these reasons, if Europe is threatened by piracy, the U.S. may be threatened as well.
Finally, a future item that may pose a threat to U.S. security concerns is the
question of who these pirates become if regional navies or private security eventually
succeed in removing offshore piracy, as largely happened off Somalia. If Gulf piracy
were eliminated, the Delta would still remain devastated and unsustainable. What other
occupation could these pirates do next? This is not to suggest piracy should be allowed to
flourish, merely that the Nigerian youth could then access regional insurgency and
extremist outlets where piracy-expertise could be well employed. As one problem is
eradicated, it may become necessary for policymakers to formulate other social and
political options before being faced with a new problem. Unemployed pirates may
otherwise transition into shore-based crimes such as pipeline bunkering. These types of
transition would represent entirely new threats to U.S. security and oblige a revised




This Chapter’s question asks "What security-related qualities should a technology
design possess for use in multi-modal transportation passenger hubs?" This is a subject
that requires compelling a linkage between typically-unrelated transportation security
modes. Since there is limited scholarly literature or data available on the subject of inter-
modal security practices, this Chapter is not intended to canvas all possible solutions. Our
contribution here is a preliminary investigation as to whether risk-mitigation (and
security) models used by airports and rail can apply to ferry and cruise ship terminals. If
so, this Chapter discusses over-arching qualities essential to a system that can protect
passengers, regardless of the transportation environment.
To begin, it is important to define common characteristics shared by airport/rail
passenger security and ferry/cruise terminal security. Similarly, all four transportation
modes incur hubs, centralized, populated areas in which passengers congregate while
awaiting their respective transportation. Next, these hubs all require a transfer of
passengers to an airplane, cruise ship, ferry or train. Third, each mode involves an issue
of expediency. While expediency varies by mode, each transportation system necessitates
a constant, reliable flow of passengers from entry through security, to queuing areas, and
finally, to conveyance. Fourth, once passengers are onboard their conveyance, the
security protocols become relatively lax in comparison to the transportation hubs.
Generally, there are no further security measures past the final transportation security
checkpoints. An adversary, once onboard, has progressed beyond formal screening
mechanisms. The security hubs, or terminals, also share important security
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characteristics. They facilitate high passenger volume, are restrained by the limits of their
physical space, and present scarce contingency options in the event of emergency. Lastly,
each transportation mode represents a setting where explosions, fire, smoke, chemical
release, or gunfire can rapidly produce devastating damage in a confined, moving battle
space. For ferries, cruise ships and planes, surviving passengers would need to contend
with obstacles presented by mid-air or in-water emergencies. For these reasons, it is
essential security be provided at passenger terminal hubs, before boarding or embarking.
This Chapter examines four transportation modes in a format designed to compare
whether airport security principles can crossover to other transportation hubs,
specifically, ferry and cruise ship terminal security. This Chapter finds airport security
practices have greater utility than rail for a number of reasons; a subject to be discussed.
The paper then shifts to selecting three airport models that may be best suited for high
volume ferry/cruise terminals. These models are selected and tested against five
transportation-specific security concepts deemed essential to multi-modal success. The
hypothesis is that by evaluating three airport models with five specific transportation
security conditions, the resultant 15 variables will yield airport practices that can (or
cannot) transplant to ferry/cruise terminal security. This approach uses a deliberative
method to narrow down those principles and models well designed for transposing the
demands of differing security environments. As money and time have been heavily
invested into airport security since 9/11, there are superb airport models already in use
that may offer lateral value. The idea of this Chapter is to not only avoid “re-inventing
the wheel”, but to determine whether versatile and proven airport security practices can
be introduced across a variety of transportation hubs.
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Literature Review
Question: "What security-related qualities should a technology possess when designed
for use in multi-modal transportation passenger hubs?"
This literature review first analyzes conceptual transportation security concepts,
and then includes a subsidiary airport-specific review of models that embody how airport
security experts protect their airports. Using this bifurcated method, this Chapter
combines analysis of concepts and practices to develop core security criteria that offer
crossover value to cruise and/or ferry terminals. The criteria then serve as a template for
testing a few technology examples in the Data Section.  It should be noted there is a
shallow pool of available rail security literature; airport-related security governs the
existing scholarly discussion.
Resilience
Cox, et al offers several characterizations of transportation security. Foremost
among these is the concept of Resilience. Resilience for our purposes describes whether
the security system can withstand internal impact, such as an electrical outage, or external
damage from an intruder. In addition, resiliency implies an ability to rely on
contingencies and the flexibility to avoid a complete system failure. The nature of
airports and train stations as fixed transportation nodes compels a resilient approach to
security, including a reliance on the public to adapt, when needed, as transportation
system users. Terrorists adapt as well through “threat-shifting”114, so from a risk
management view, offsetting this asymmetric volatility with resilient air, rail or maritime
transportation-based security is equally essential. Cox cites Rose’s definition of resilience
114 Andrew Cox, Fynnwin Prager, and Adam Rose, Transportation security and the role of resilience: A
foundation for operational metrics. Transport Policy (2011), 18 (2) (03): p, 308.
83
as either “static resiliency” in which the system must “maintain function”, or “dynamic
resiliency” in which the system must “recover rapidly.”115 For ferries, both static and
dynamic resiliency would apply. For cruise ships, static resiliency applies. This is
because cruise ships are not a primary form of public transportation. Based on a credible
threat, cruise ships can delay vacationers for several hours if needed and then make up
the lost time while underway, over the course of a 5-7 day cruise. Ferries do not have this
luxury. Maintaining function and recovery time are both critical; as soon as one ferry
departs the dock, another may be arriving.
Resilience is only one component of a risk-based approach. In Szyliowicz’s
examination of risk assessment methods, he points to aging infrastructure, passenger
congestion, a habituation to computer-controlled systems (rail switches, air traffic,
sensors), and buy-in from both private and public sector as all being key
considerations.116 In terms of private airlines, Amtrak and cruise lines, they cannot obtain
classified information, putting these stakeholders at disadvantage. Private air and cruise
security is expected to provide all-threat mitigation, without necessarily being privy to
the threats. Szyliowicz emphasizes transportation resiliency is a viable way to offset this
challenge using resource capabilities. For example, The San Francisco BART metro
helped fill the void in 1989 following a major unexpected earthquake. Conversely, New
Orleans revealed poor transportation resiliency following Hurricane Katrina. In our
context, Szyliowicz implies that New Orleans suffered (despite advanced Hurricane
awareness) whereas San Francisco persevered (without prior earthquake knowledge). In
115 Ibid., 308.
116 Joseph S. Szyliowicz, Safeguarding critical transportation infrastructure: The US case. Transport Policy (2013), 28
(07): 70.
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both cases, transportation resiliency was a major factor. Bruneau and Reinhorn use the
term resiliency slightly different in terms of transportation security; their definition
encompasses four subclasses: “robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness and rapidity.”117
Bruneau and Reinhorn’s terms robustness and rapidity highlight Cox’s static and
dynamic resiliency and echo Szyliowicz’s emphasis on resourcefulness. Redundancy is a
stimulating idea when looking at maritime transportation hubs.  Ferries and Cruise ships
both typically embrace redundancy measures within a port; other docks and terminals are
typically available for contingency purposes, if needed. In short, every definition of
resiliency afforded by these authors contributes an important facet when considering the
value of this term in transportation risk assessment; resiliency is one of the key Criteria
highlighted for discussion in the Methodology Section.
Efficiency and Effectiveness
Johnston’s transportation security model initially described airport productivity as
being a “combination of percentages of efficiency and effectiveness.”118 Security, if taken
to an extreme, can become an adversary to productivity. In terms of an airport’s ultimate
goal, safe and profitable operations, this Chapter must consider both productivity and
security. Johnston’s 2004 model on the subject demonstrated a relationship between
regulated and deregulated environments, where in a regulated environment passengers
are citizens. As security becomes increasingly deregulated, passengers become customers
and the government evolves into a market. The trade-off for Johnston’s increased
“freedom and innovation” in a deregulated environment is the expense of assuming risk
(that is otherwise diminished in a regulated environment). This is an essential attribute for
117 Ibid., 73.
118 Van R. Johnston, Terrorism and transportation policy and administration: Balancing the model and equations for
optimal security. Review of Policy Research (2004), 21 (3) (05): 267-69.
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ferry and cruise security. It is imperative to ensure any technology borrowed from air/rail
security is both effective and efficient; these terms ensure profit and security can co-exist
in a transportation environment.
Johnston and Plant later revised Johnston’s 2004 model in the form of a 2008
Emerging Entrepreneurial Management and Public Policy Model. In their latter view,
they factored competition into their view of a de-regulated transportation environment
and expanded on regulated transportation to include the idea of collaboration119.
Competition and Collaboration are both instrumental security considerations. For
Competition, one company cannot be favored over another based on overly strict or lax
security. For Collaboration, public security concerns (FAA, TSA) must align with
corporate priorities to ensure sustainable revenue. Efficiency and Effectiveness are
critical underpinnings to a transportation risk stratagem. These terms, when properly
enacted, reduce risk (effectiveness) while allowing healthy market competition and high
volume ridership (efficiency). Both terms will be Criteria later in this Chapter.
Starting to come off the rails
Johnston and Plant’s theory also applies to a de-regulated rail industry (as
opposed to an increasingly regulated post-9/11 airline industry). The distinction between
air and rail security is important; increased regulation has also equated to increases in
aviation security funding, innovation and technology; conversely, the same can be said
for rail security. Common to both air and rail security is a reliance on a “collaborative
public-private model.” A cooperative approach between public-private entities is vital to
any security model. In regards to transportation security budgets, Johnstone views that
119 Van R. Johnston, and Jeremy F. Plant, Rail security after 9/11: Toward effective collaborative regulation. Public
Works Management & Policy 13 (1) (Jul 2008): p.13
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national defense and homeland security budgets need to consolidate, stating “policy
distinctions between national defense and homeland security (should) be eliminated.”120
This is an overly simplistic solution and not recommended. As indispensable as the
public-private model may be, it is also critical that private partners not be required to
wade through multiple layers of bureaucracy in order to achieve daily transportation
security, or steady-state progress.
To offer brief insight into the complexities of rail security (and a rationale as to
why rail security does not make a good template for ferry/cruise terminals), the following
applies: Both freight and passenger trains use the same set of rails while answering to
different regulations. In addition, federal rail security funding pales in comparison to
aviation-related federal funding, meaning less advancements and technology for rail
security. There is already a small profit margin in passenger rail; additional security
measures would only slow ridership. As further financial challenge to rail security, there
is also a general prohibition against private rail using federal rail funds for security.  In
addition, rail presents a unique vulnerability; since rails run continuously and cannot be
disrupted at any point along the length of tracks, all 171 thousand miles of US tracks
must be uniformly protected. Waugh aptly describes this challenge as “indefensible.”121
Customer-Resiliency: Moving further from the tracks
Cox suggests that resilience constitutes a “supply-side” and a “customer-side.”122
Supply-side resilience includes items like repairs and debris removal; this is the
responsibility of the transportation system mode. Customer resiliency requires passengers
120 R.W. Johnstone, Not safe enough. Issues in Science & Technology 23 (2) (Winter2007): p. 58
121 William L. Waugh Jr., Assessing the Risk to Rail and Transit systems. Public Manager 37 (4) (Winter2008): p.73.
122 Cox, Transportation security and the role of resilience: A foundation for operational metrics.(2011), p. 309
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to modify their routes, telework, and use different highways or work times. With rail,
customer-side resiliency can be removed from the equation entirely, as happened with
certain New York City (NYC) metro stations after 9/11. Zimmerman and Simonoff
studied ridership on the NYC Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) as an
indicator of rail (metro and subway) resiliency. Representing 40% of the entire nation’s
transportation, NYC MTA offers a considerable sample study. In short, the findings
revealed subways rebounded quicker than rail, but the unique discovery was the role
played by ferries that filled-in NYC ridership and demonstrated transportation resiliency.
Rail did not bounce back immediately, while ferry ridership increased 27% in the 3
months after 9/11 and then 42% six months later123.  In relation to this study, Plant stated
“there are no specific programs or subunits primarily concerned with railroad
security.”124 It appears passengers seem to know this as well. Passengers left rail for
another mass transit system entirely (poignantly, illustrating the resilience of ferries).
Considerations: Inter-modal and International Regulations
Finally, Szyliowicz, in his review of international transportation security,
broadens perspective on intermodal transportation. While I disagree with his assertion
that “shipping lines would require months to return to normalcy”125 his point regarding
the intermodal nature of transportation security is well-suited. In particular, identifying
central nodes where airport travelers link to cruise ship terminals, or where highways lead
to ferries, is worthy of future research; these locations of confluence directly fuse aviation
123 Rae Zimmerman and Jeffrey S. Simonoff. Transportation density and opportunities for expediting recovery to
promote security. Journal of Applied Security Research (2009), 4 (1) (01): p. 55-56
124 Jeremy F. Plant, Terrorism and the railroads: Redefining security in the wake of 9/11. Review of Policy
Research (2004), 21 (3) (05): p. 301.
125 Joseph S. Szyliowicz, Safeguarding critical transportation infrastructure: The US case. Transport Policy (2013), 28
(07): p. 354
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and maritime security agendas. For numerous reasons described in this first portion of
literature review, rail security does not present nearly as promising a model for transplant
to ferry/cruise terminals as aviation security. Based on the research, rail transportation
security is underfunded, historically de-regulated, and by its nature, unalterably exposed
to attack. Moving forward, the focus is on identifying additional qualities from aviation
security-technologies that can thrive in inter-modal security.
Airport-specific Literature Review:
The most thorough scrutiny on airport security can be found in assessments
conducted by subject experts who work in this field. These experts are typically
represented by one of three major professions: architectural engineers, security
consultants or airport security managers.  This does not imply only these occupations
represent a voice on the subject, but rather, these occupations tend to comprise the
scholarly body of work. The body of peer-reviewed, published work in this arena tends to
have two factors in common. One, aviation-security articles are well-represented in the
Journal of Airport Management. While the Journal was not a default search for airport
security literature, this source represented a wellspring for peer-reviewed, scholarly
approaches on the topic. Second, the three major professions: engineers (hired to
construct a secure environment), consultants (hired to improve security practices), and
security managers (hired to oversee security practices) offered aviation commentary on
security and risk-mitigation that was germane and professionally objective.
An airport engineer, Samola describes the Redesign Passenger Process (RPP),
used in Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport. RPP is an approach to viewing passengers as an
interactive aspect of the airport security environment, where the goals are to “increase
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capacity, improve efficiency, and improve punctuality.” 126 Conceptually, this engages
use of fewer passenger check-in booths and allows passengers the freedom to check-in
where they choose. This randomness facilitates indiscriminate passenger distribution
patterns in airport queuing areas.  Randomness is typically initiated by security experts
who select impromptu security measures to be used at improvised locations or times. By
allowing travelers to form the random patterns, this naturally disrupts pattern formation,
making an attack on a transportation hub difficult to plan.  Samola discusses that RPP
allows early, on-time, and late passengers to form basic semblances of patterns, making
queue areas easier to monitor atypical behaviors that may be present.
Assembly Lines and Layered Security (in a confined area)
Calder concurs with Samola’s basic premise on passenger predictability, although
he approaches air passengers very differently, emphasizing a structured assembly line
concept. His correlative argument is that a “factory production line achieves a predictable
flow… and predictable throughput.”127 Calder implies that passengers who may be
receptive to new technologies, such as millimeter-wave scanners (as Samola suggests),
are likely to continue to do so, unless information is brought to bear that would change
their approach. Calder supports this argument by citing bell-curve data that aligns with
Samola, to wit, passengers tend to arrive in batches of early, on-time and last-minute
groups. Further, Calder states passenger predictability is founded on types of flights
(business-oriented vs. vacation destinations), and time of day (early flights have less
early-arrival passengers since people tend to sleep in). Bloch and Payne also offer a
126 Betty Samola, Innovations in passenger and baggage processing at Schiphol Airport. Journal of Airport
Management 2 (3) (Apr 2008): 227-229
127 David Calder, Who says 'passengers aren't baked beans'? Making passenger security screening productive while
delivering high service levels. Journal of Airport Management 4 (4) (Jul 2010): 335-6.
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similar production-based model in which “capacity determines production rate.”128 This
view aligns more with Calder than Samola, as Bloch and Payne state a reliance on
successful, safe passenger travel is a norm derived from production metrics, rather than
Samola’s emphasis on social modeling predicting behaviors.
These passenger tendencies all tie back to the research question as to what
security qualities are needed in a technology to apply in multiple transportation hubs.
Each author’s variation speaks to the same subtle messaging: humans need technology to
manage the task of observing other humans who tend in volume to produce reliable
transportation patterns. While Bloch/Payne and Calder recommend a statistical, assembly
line methodology, Samola posits the airport design should be made to adapt to passenger
tendencies. Bloch/Payne, Calder or Samola’s perspectives can be integrated into a
security model that uses existing space (i.e. cruise terminal waiting areas, passenger ferry
queues) and account for passenger tendencies within confines of that space.
Regardless of how technology is implemented, there is a clear linear dynamic that
should be captured as Criteria. Human security capital needs technology that interacts.
The technology can be taught to observe randomness-anomalies, or assembly line
disruptions, but only a human operator can truly distinguish the nuances of human
behavior. Since the technology is required to handle such a large volume of passengers,
the Human Security and Technology must interact to identify aberrations in Passenger
Tendencies/Patterns. This concept is labeled Human-Technology Interface (HTI).
Human Security Technology Passenger Tendencies/Patterns (Anomalies)
128 Paul Bloch and Claire Payne. Optimising passenger security-screening operations. Journal of Airport Management 1
(1) (Sep 2006): p. 9
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Layers of Risk
Locating security checkpoints, passenger screening areas, and biometrics in the
right physical airport locations is a science, contends Diedam, in his four-level
Transportation Security Pyramid129. Diedam’s Pyramid views access to the airport in
terms of “openings.” An “opening” can be an exterior door, an idle baggage chute or a
retail-loading dock within the airport, for example. Bloch also emphasizes the physical
location of doors and structures inside the airport. The proximity of screening areas to
retail establishments matter, because where people buy products, it takes longer to screen
for instance. Retail workers need routine access, passengers may have food/drinks in
hand, etc.130 These are valuable insights for ferry and cruise security, where terminals
also have retail facilities and security must consider not only exterior access points but
risk points inside the terminal where passengers tend to gather in numbers.
Similar to Diedam’s approach to layered security, Lennerman examines risk-
layering as well. Swedavia is a Swedish airport company where Lennerman directs
security operations. His model uses a 6 layered system “based on the hypothesis that
systematic work provides a high level of security regardless of whether the threat comes
from, outside or inside.”131 Lennerman differs from Diedam’s approach in that his
Swedavia model covers boundary security in the first layer, where Diedam addresses
boundaries as three of the Pyramid’s first four layers. In line with these methods of
layered security are the views of Ghavamifar, et al on the subject. From their civil
engineering perspective, Ghavamifar and cohorts view the layers in a purely physical
129 John Diedam. Access control: The process of securing a transportation site. Journal of Airport Management 3 (3)
(Apr 2009): 263-73.
130 Bloch and Payne, Optimizing passenger security-screening operations. p.11
131 Anders Lennerman, Protecting the airport from an insider threat: A systematic approach to aviation
security. Journal of Airport Management 6 (3) (Summer 2012): 225-30.
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state, dividing the airport into an air-side, land-side and terminals.132 Their layers raise
the issue of construction personnel working at the airport, who often bring heavy
equipment (potentially explosive-laden) into passenger proximity. There are many ways
to layer security in an airport or ferry terminal; regardless of the procedure or technology
used, the concept of risk-layering is essential and represents the fifth and final Criteria.
Refining Security Habits
Lastly, for aviation-specific security, although focused on passengers, the Chapter
would be remiss without addressing the significance of personnel working inside the
airport security layers on a daily basis. In this regard, there are 2 major elements that
appear to translate well to a maritime security environment: training and testing.
Lennerman’s emphasis on quality compliance should be woven directly into any program
that routinely assesses security protocols.  Eldar does a thorough review of personnel
working in the airport security community, defining roles of the employer, the passenger,
and security personnel, from his article “The human factor in aviation security”133.
Eldar’s input should be considered in any selected technology or protocol: recruitment,
staff retention, noisy work conditions, flux in passenger volume and seasonal change in
security workforce should all be consistently viewed in a transportation security milieu.
Weiss’ review of the Dynamic Security Airport Simulator includes methods on how best
to achieve this daunting task, testing employees with practical scenarios that identify
patterns such as passenger “busyness”, and “suspicious behavior.”134
132 Kamran Ghavamifar, Bakhshi Payam, and Touran Ali. Owner's control and risks in various airport delivery
methods. Journal of Airport Management 5 (1) (Oct 2010): p. 44.
133 Zamir Eldar, The human factor in aviation security. Journal of Airport Management 5 (1) (Oct 2010): p. 37-39.
134 Wiliam E. Weiss, Development and use of the dynamic security model for airports. Journal of Airport
Management 5 (3) (Apr 2011): 245-54.
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In summary, there are several key findings when looking at security related
qualities which a technology should possess in order to offer utility in multi-modal
transportation hubs.  Cox and Szyliowicz’ emphasis on the value of resilience within
transportation is imperative.  Cox and Rose’s view on static and dynamic resiliency
highlights function and speedy recovery, which as indicated, differs slightly as priority
when comparing ferries with cruise ship security.  Cruise ships rely on passengers who
vacation rather than commute. Cox also infers an imperative distinction between airports,
ferry and cruise terminals. Airports and ferry terminals are akin in servicing both
recreational and business travelers. Cruise terminals do not serve commuters, although
they do contribute to the U.S. economy. In short, Cox, Szyliowicz and Bruneau/Reinhorn
illuminate the value of resiliency, but more research is still required to distinguish the
threshold speeds of recovery for cruise, ferry and airport terminals; there is a finite period
of inactivity for each of these industries before they suffer financially. This body of
literature has not made clear what that comparative threshold is for ferry and cruise
terminals. Johnston’s next point on efficiency and effectiveness can play a significant
role in forecasting the macro-level resilience of a transportation system, a subject worthy
of additional research.
The terms effectiveness/efficiency address the private-public terminal relationship
and apply to ferry and cruise terminals. Every terminal must balance the demands of
regulated security while ensuring commercial productivity. The focus on ensuring
effectiveness and efficiency remains a focal theme in any form of applicable technology.
It may be possible (although not recommended) to utilize a less-resilient, or less-layered
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system in a ferry or cruise environment, as those qualities can be buttressed by other
supportive technologies if needed.  However, any technology that transfers from airports
to ports must be both highly efficient and highly effective. There is no room for
compromise on effectiveness and efficiency.
Calder, Bloch/Payne, and Samola all highlight technologies that integrate human
traffic tendencies, and the predictable movements of passengers. Their findings are
disparate and each of their models is unlike another. However, one commonality revealed
by their work is central to this Chapter; technology alone is not enough. Humans will
always be required to make the final distinction in pattern anomalies at transportation
hubs. As Calder implies, an assembly-line still requires someone to monitor the conveyor
belt. This analogy is crucial to the study; a technology that can transplant from an airport
to a cruise terminal should be comparable to an assembly line worker using the same
conveyor belt in Tulsa or Detroit. The literature suggests that a technology suited for
multi-modal environs may work well on its own 95% of the time. In fact, the more the
technology incorporates multiple layers as Diedam suggests the more efficient it becomes
and less vulnerable to a single point of failure. However, the technology must still require
an operator to investigate those 5% of anomalies that necessitate judgment and
management, as Lennerman contends. This is the strongest deduced finding garnered
from my review of these multiple airport security stratagems.
Lastly, Eldar and Lennerman illustrate that while technology is vital, equally
necessary are skilled personnel who are frequently trained, tested, and improved with use
of any selected technology. The more security can rely on technology to help observe
passenger behaviors on a large-scale, fast-moving basis, the better the human operator
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will become at identifying irregularities. This concept, along with: resiliency,
effectiveness, efficiency, and risk-layering form the root of the next endeavor. The idea is
to now relate these multi-modal transportation concepts to actual technologies; the
Methodology will create several business rules that help test these concepts on real-world
airport security protocols.
Hypothesis
The literature suggests that five over-arching security principles used in airport
security can apply to ferry and cruise ship terminal security. The literature also suggests
that in terms of tangible airport and rail security principles (where tangible means real,
operational security practices), tangible airport security protocols offer higher crossover
utility for ferry and cruise ship security. Tangible rail security practices will not be
pursued. It is the Chapter’s hypothesis that by evaluating three designated airport security
protocols against a standard of five Criteria (identified next in Methodology) serviceable
qualities from aviation security that also bode well for employment in reducing security
risks to ferry/cruise terminal will be demonstrated.
Methodology
The methodology for this data research derives from the hypothesis that airport
security protocols that incorporate particular criteria (intervening variables, see criteria
below) can positively influence the relationship between ferry/cruise terminal
environments (independent variable) and the quality of security (dependent variable) in
those environments. In order to test this hypothesis, three intervening variables are
assessed: Total Airport Security System (TASS), Social Force Model (SFM), and
Behavior Detection practices. These variables have been selected because they all require
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an interface between humans and technology; the extent of this interaction will be
examined in Criteria #2 (below). In addition, each of these models has been touted by
experts as either some of the finest (TASS, SFM) or most controversial (Behavior
Detection) practices being employed in airport risk-management today.
These intervening variables need to abide 2 sets of criteria that suggest an ability
of these risk-reduction protocols to enhance security-quality in ferry and cruise terminal
security environments.  Criteria-selection is based on characteristics gleaned from the
literature review and my 17 years working in maritime security. Meeting both criteria is a
necessary condition.
1. Core Principles: Based on core academic principles highlighted by the Literature
Review, does the airport security model embrace four essential principles? These
principles are:
Resiliency: can the protocol adapt, or withstand short-term internal/external duress?
Effectiveness: does the protocol enhance the quality of security?
Efficiency: can the protocol sustain peak passenger volume while remaining
effective?
Risk-layering: does the protocol include layers to shield system failure or physical
intrusion?
2. Human-Technology Interface: Does the airport security model ingrain use of
technology and human-derived skill sets (judgment, common sense, inference)
that require human involvement in the process/system? This criterion implies that
a shared strength of human qualities –and- technology is crucial to higher quality
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of security. This criterion will be termed human-technology-interface (HTI). The
Chapter will frequently reference HTI.
There are many other criteria that likely merit future study (i.e. does the system
require highly specialized training or can many security personnel be easily trained? Does
the process work best if used randomly or incorporated as a standard procedure?) For the
scope of this study, the focus is on the principles identified as having highest utility in
both airport and cruise/ferry security, and evaluating whether the protocols emphasize
symbiotic human/technology interface.
If one or more sets of the stated criteria are not present, then consider that model to be
incomplete and not recommended for use in maritime transportation terminals.
The following Methodology assumptions apply:
 Intervening variables (airport security protocols) refer to transportation hubs only
(airport, cruise, and ferry terminals).Transport modes do not apply (planes, ferries,
ships).
 Intervening variables pertain to passengers only. This Chapter is not currently
evaluating protocols for transporting cargo, luggage, vehicles, or hazardous material.
 Discussion on millimeter wave, backscatter, thermal sensor imagery, and other
technologies in which humans operate the system is purposefully omitted. Instead,
focusing on protocols where a human works with the technology.
 No specific security industry products are being endorsed. Products mentioned by
trade-name simply embody an aspect of the criteria that illustrates a point.
 Partnership between public/private stakeholders is assumed necessary in all protocols.
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Data
Seeing the Big Picture
It is appropriate to begin an examination of airport security models that may be
suited for ferry or cruise terminals by contrasting the difference in passenger volume
through a ferry terminal and a cruise terminal. Since the cruise ship environment
generally vets individual passengers more closely (i.e. passenger manifests, x-ray
screening on luggage) than ferries, and cruise ships depart less frequently than ferries,
cruise ship security can generally conduct a more detailed scrutiny of passengers than a
ferry terminal. For perspective, the Seattle terminal in the Washington State Ferry System
supports 72 arrivals and departures daily through one terminal alone, using ferries whose
maximum capacity can exceed 2,000 passengers.135 In the same city of Seattle for
example, the Port of Seattle will see three cruise ship departures, three days a week, at 2
cruise terminals (during height of cruise season).136 These ships similarly carry 2000+
passengers apiece but see half a dozen weekend departures from a cruise terminal, as
opposed to 500 ferry arrivals and departures a week. The frequency of vessels leaving the
dock is the demarcation between total cruise and ferry passenger throughput. Based on
the bulk of passengers moving through the system, a ferry terminal in effect, more closely
resembles an airport on a day to day basis; a cruise terminal may resemble an airport’s
pace of volume on very limited occasion and only during a few summer months.
One commonality between ferry and cruise security is that operators in both
environments, like airports, are required to look for uncharacteristic patterns in mass-
135 Washington State Department of Transportation, 2013 Ferry Schedule Information (by route),
http://www.wsdot.com/ferries/schedule/ extracted 07NOV2013
136 Port of Seattle, Seattle’s Downtown Cruise Terminals (2013)
http://www.portseattle.org/cruise/Pages/default.aspx extracted 07NOV2013
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passenger movements. The security personnel must rely on technology that is advanced
enough to warn of danger, while being simple enough for the operator to keep up with a
steady flow of passengers.
Over the last several years, London has shared a dubious distinction in having
both their airport and metro systems targeted for attack. Perhaps for these reasons, the
British are among the pack leaders in developing procedures that mesh the strengths of
technology and human judgment in helping to prevent another terrorist event. At
Heathrow airport, the Total Airport Security System (TASS) is in prototype development
as one of the front-runners of the HTI concept.137 Funded through the European Union,
TASS allows a single user, in a command and control center, to use multiple sensors and
video feeds. TASS can recognize facial patterns by linking to international terrorist
databases, running vehicle plate checks, monitoring gate controls, responding to
hazardous material indicators, and deploying remote bomb control robots. The computer
infers an attack scenario by correlating any number of seemingly disparate factors that
might go unobserved by a single command/control element. As one criterion is human-
technology interface (HTI), the TASS system meets that criterion. The role assumed by
airport security personnel operating these systems translates well to a ferry terminal.
As far as alignment with the stated core principles, TASS’s computer is able to
assimilate the license plate of a vehicle illegally parked outside ‘Arrivals’ as well as a
passenger who is suspiciously loitering just inside the adjacent terminal door. This ability
represents the principle of risk-layering. The computer associates an exterior layer of risk
137 Lee Hibbert, "Alert to the Real Dangers," Professional Engineering 25, no. 11 (11, 2012), 24-26
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(vehicle) with a second layer of risk (a person of interest who is inside the building, but
still physically outside the Terminal/queuing areas). TASS then prompts a human
operator to evaluate the scenario for action, further investigate, or to dismiss as a false
alarm. While this scenario is indicative of the risk layering principle, and is more
effective than either a machine or human could be on their own, two other principles must
be considered. For one, additional data is needed on the resiliency of a system such as
TASS. For instance: how do the CCTV-feeds operate in low light, does TASS (or a
system like it) tend to false alarm, what are the likely fallibilities when an untrained or
inexperienced operator uses the system, can a perpetrator bypass TASS, are there gaps in
perimeter coverage, and how does the system operate under environmental duress (wind,
rain, heat sensitivity, etc.)? In this case, answering resiliency-based questions is the
crucial determinant as to whether this type of system can be highly efficient, or not.
In a similar vein, London’s other major aviation hub, Gatwick International
Airport, has also employed another variation of HTI, via their airport’s experimental use
of the Social Force Model.138 Like TASS, this model fuses technology with a reliance on
human interface. The Social Force Model works by applying algorithms to congested
terminal areas, mathematically predicting where passengers tend to walk within the
airport. This guesswork is necessary; as passengers leave one camera’s field of view there
is a gap in space and time before they enter another camera’s view. The significance of
this technology for airports and ferry/cruise terminals is that operators are allowed to not
only track where passengers move within an airport, but where they tend not to go. If a
138Riccardo Mazzon, and Andrea Cavallaro. Multi-Camera Tracking using a Multi-Goal Social Force Model.
Neurocomputing 100 (2013), (01/16): 41-50
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person-of-interest disappears from view, this may prompt security to investigate, but can
narrow down where the passenger most likely went next. The Social Force Model uses
three general observations to track passenger flow. Mazzon and Cavallaro’s model look
at people moving in large “macroscopic” groups, as “microscopic” individuals moving in
a crowd, and as groups of “mesoscopic” passengers, where “movements” of a targeted
group of people are “like a moving blob.”139 The advantage of the mesoscopic approach
is airport security can then track the movement of blue forces (i.e. specialized SWAT
teams, bomb squads, etc.) in addition to identifying where potential terrorists may be
acting in pairs or clusters. Using the Social Force Model, an HTI component is integral in
two regards.  The operator must remain consistently engaged with the camera and
software to track movement of passengers. Second, the communication between
ferry/cruise command center elements and foot-patrol security is also paramount in
pinpointing a location.
For ferries, this model offers real utility; the entire flow of walk-on passengers
tends to queue for embarkation and debarkation in a few centralized locations. The
passengers then transit through a corridor to/from the ferry and either disperse to open
seating areas on the vessel, or to exit routes, once at the dock. This limits the number of
locations where cameras are required, but those points of camera-interface are decisive. If
a passenger stops for example between the queuing area and the walk-on corridor, they
create congestion in a fatal funnel, theoretically blocking hundreds of passengers in a
place where they may be stopping to detonate a device. In addition to the HTI (human-
technology interface) value of uninterrupted camera views, this model offers resiliency
139 Ibid., p. 42
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based on the fact the cameras are already working. Social Force Model is merely
reinforcing gaps in the cameras, so any improvement in this regard is more resilient, and
more effective through use of an additional risk-layer. The benefit of Social Force Model
is this model is not a system unto itself; it is an augment to the ferry, cruise or airport
surveillance systems. It can only increase the efficiency of CCTV systems by shoring up
the ability to maintain uninterrupted camera views. In attempting to track one person, or
several individuals, this concept enhances human ability to make the most of available
technologies and to incorporate core principles; this concept is advocated for use in ferry
and cruise terminals.
The human technology aspect must include more than training, testing and using
hardware, such as TASS and the Social Force Model. Background checks and no-fly (or
no-sail) lists are a valuable incorporation of technology and human capital, but the results
of these checks can be misleading and overwhelming. For example, the FBI’s Terrorist
Screening Center hosts a list for aviation purposes of 8500 passengers who cannot fly
into, within, or out of the U.S. In contrast, a separate database is also referenced in the
aviation industry, called the Terrorist Watch List, containing 400,000 passenger names.140
In reality, the number of passengers meriting additional screening is likely somewhere
between these figures. For passenger no-fly lists, how does an airport screener know who
requires further screening? For cruise ships, there is a passenger manifest, but for ferries
who often take cash payments from travelers, there is no list. In this regard, ferry security
140 Joshua Sinai, "New Trends in Airport & Aviation Security," Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland
Security International 18, no. 3 (Fall 2012): 30-37
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personnel must rely on human judgment. Aside from canines that work ferry docks,
security in this arena is largely reliant on gut-instinct.
Behavior Patterns
In looking at a proposed emphasis on HTI, ferry security would benefit from
adopting a program that teaches security personnel to identify behavior patterns that are
outside the norm. Behavioral pattern methodology embraces risk-layering, effectiveness,
and resiliency. The one concern with this approach is efficiency. If security personnel are
trained improperly to recognize behavior patterns, they can potentially impact the supply
chain (unnecessary, additional screening), or the transit system writ large (i.e., by racial
profiling). Next, this Chapter captures data that helps isolate whether behavior patterns
can be efficient in ferry and cruise security.
As one would expect, the Israelis have been implementing behavior recognition
protocols in aviation security for years. Dating back 35 years, the original behavior
pattern studies began with the work of Ekman and Friesen in their research on the Facial
Action Coding System (FACS)141, where they analyzed participants’ expressions and
facial muscles after being asked a variety of questions. Their findings were adopted in
U.S. transportation when DHS began a formalized SPOT program (Screening Passengers
by Observation Technique) in 2003. DHS-TSA employed Behavior Detection Officers
(BDO) to assess passenger behavioral mannerisms and the program has been viewed with
mixed success.142 Part of the positive reception behind the Israelis use of FACS has been
related to the size of their airports, as compared with U.S. air terminals. Ben Gurion
141 Justin Florence and Robert Friedman, Profiles in Terror: A Legal Framework for the Behavioral Profiling
Paradigm George Mason Law Review, Vol. 17:2 (2010), 423-480.
142 Ibid., p. 425
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International Airport for example, hosts 10 million annual passengers, while Atlanta
International boasts nearly ten times that number over the course of the same year.143
This implies that Israeli screeners routinely process 1/10th as many passengers through
the gates as screeners at a high volume U.S. airport. This attribute allows Israeli screeners
to be increasingly selective with whom they select for behavioral detection as well as the
time they can spend practicing this technique. This comparison makes a useful analogy
for cruise terminal screening. Cruise terminals typically see 2000-6000 daily passengers,
per terminal, on busy days in a summer cruise schedule. Atlanta International averages
250,000 passengers a day. This means the cruise industry by pure passenger volume
could adopt a similar behavior detection program. It is important to note that since cruise
travel is more of a tourist industry than a true transportation mode, this level of scrutiny
would likely aggravate passengers. Although behavior detection may be an effective
measure in cruise security, cruise ship travelers elected their voyage, using discretionary
funds. Unlike a plane or ferry, cruise passengers do not require the cruise ship as a
transportation service. For this reason, random behavior checks are not advocated as
efficient for the cruise industry.
The utility of behavior detection techniques in the world of ferry security is
slightly different. The presence of high passenger volume, confined spaces that hold
hundreds of awaiting ferry riders, and a general absence of metal or explosives detection
protocols for foot passengers necessitates a very acute level of human awareness in the
ferry terminal environment. Before recommending behavior detection techniques as an
143 Hartsfield-Jackson, Atlanta International Airport website, Fact Sheet http://www.atlanta-
airport.com/Airport/ATL/ATL_FactSheet.aspx (accessed 30OCT, 2013)
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efficient model for ferry security, the study should further research variations of behavior
detection being utilized in airport security.
Behavior detection techniques have come under considerable scrutiny for use in
airports.  The JASON study, an independent report contracted by the Pentagon in 2008,
and a multi-year Government Accountability Office 2010 report both cite the lack of any
credible scientific data on Ekman’s research with FACS.144 Contrarily, DHS-TSA points
to their success with FACS in 2006-2009, having conducted 232,000 secondary
screenings, leading to over 1700 arrests.145 Amidst the debate, DHS has nonetheless
taken the next step in behavior detection with continued research on Future Attribute
Screening Technology (FAST).  An evolution of behavior detection, FAST tests the
“malintent theory” by having passengers walk through a machine that serves as the
equivalent of a human lie detector. Trained screeners look for increased heartbeat,
sweating, erratic movement, and other physiological characteristics to determine
anomalies using technology and human judgment. Initial scientific results suggest FAST
may offer 70% accuracy,146 making the system significantly better at pure behavioral
detection than human screeners have shown to date. Advances in behavior detection are
advocated as strong support of risk-layering and effectiveness. Resiliency of a behavior-
detection system would depend on public receptivity; travelers in airports or ferries are
often in a rush and stressed; the same physiological factors that indicate malintent may
actually be stress indicators. If the FAST model can be shown to distinguish the
difference between stress and malicious intent, and can enjoy some initial success in the
144 Sharon Weinberger, "Airport Security: Intent to Deceive?" Nature 465, no. 7297 (05/27, 2010): 412-415
145 Ibid., p. 414
146 Ibid., p. 415
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airport environment, then the same could be expected in a ferry environment. Passing the
test of public receptivity and the efficiency demands of an airport suggest a FAST-type
model would pass scrutiny in ferry security as well.
In a continued review of possible behavior detection procedure efficiency, there is
value in adjusting perspective on transportation security in general. For illustration, there
are two schools of thought that involve adjustments to airport screening without
introducing new technologies. These philosophical approaches to security do not
necessarily refute HTI; they compel a re-examination of the interface between humans
and existing technologies. For example, Parks’ research on “close-sensing”147 states that
a screening checkpoint is a process that combines machines (millimeter wave x-rays) as
the first layer needed to sense anomalies and then human agents follow with actual
touching. If HTI is applied correctly, the human uses the available tools to identify only
the parts of a passenger’s body that must be touched. Should this approach be
categorically trained in both airports and cruise terminals, the security checkpoint
experience would expectedly become increasingly efficient and effective. The idea of
machine-first, human contact-second also utilizes risk-layering. In this case, resiliency
increases relative to efficiency. When done right, passengers move through the
transportation hub seamlessly, and process resiliency grows along with public
confidence.
147 Lisa Parks, "Points of Departure: The Culture of US Airport Screening," Journal of Visual Culture, 6, no. 2
(08, 2007): 183-200
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In a similar approach, McLay, et al cites use of “security classes” as the future of
airport screening.148 The classes conform to the relative level of security risk posed by
the passengers, depending on previous arrests, frequent-flyers, biometrics, etc. If
implemented correctly, these “security classes” could be randomly re-ordered daily, or
even by the hour, so passengers did not feel profiled or marked at security. This model
would also allow newer screeners to work the lines of passengers posing lower risk, or to
be mentored by more experienced security personnel who work the more challenging
lines. The idea here is that new technologies are only as good as the people using them.
Different technologies and HTI can apply differently dependent on how passengers are
categorized for screening. In Parks and McLay’s models, efficiency, effectiveness and
risk-layering are inexpensive solutions that migrate easily between airport and cruise
terminal security modes. It is critical that when evaluating the potential success of
employing inter-modal models that we rely on introducing and training any risk-layered
model in a method that advocates effectiveness for the terminal, efficiency for the
passenger and system resiliency.
Table 3 compares the three models (TASS, Social Force Model and Behavior
Detection) against the five selected variables. The Analysis Section will discuss each
model’s adherence or unsuitability to these variables and will explain why the Social
Force Model was determined to be the best choice in meeting all five criteria defined by
our Methodology.
148 Laura A. McLay, Adrian J. Lee and Sheldon H. Jacobson, "Risk-Based Policies for Airport Security
Checkpoint Screening," Transportation Science, 44, no. 3 (08, 2010): 333-349
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TASS Social Force Model Behavior Detection
Resiliency TBD  TBD
Effectiveness   TBD
Efficiency TBD  TBD




Table 3: Cross-comparison of Models using Methodology Criteria
Analysis
Following a review of the literature, the original question was narrowed down
regarding whether airport and rail security could apply to protecting passengers in the
cruise ship and ferry terminal environments. Rail security was not pursued for several
reasons. For one, the trove of literature on airport security outweighed any collegial
dialogue available on rail security. It is unclear whether the subject of rail security has not
been explored to the same extent as airport security, or whether rail protection details are
shielded within industry trade craft from public exposure. A third option, as Waugh
stated, is that rail security may simply be “indefensible”. Unless every inch of rail is
guarded, the task of maintaining a continuous set of exposed tracks is unmanageable,
leaving the entire rail transportation system unprotected. In determining that rail security
was not a model from which ferry or cruise security should borrow security concepts, the
first deduction was to focus the methodology on airport security practices.
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Seven core principles were gleaned from the literature review: resiliency,
effectiveness, efficiency, risk-layering, intermodal regulations, refining security habits
(training and testing), and use of assembly lines. The Chapter supported six of these core
principles and elected to focus on the first four. Regulations are beyond the scope of this
paper. In regards to security habits, training and testing should be incorporated regardless
of the model (as should a public-private alliance). The principle that was not advocated is
Assembly Lines; this can be a hazardous approach. The more a security system treats
passengers alike in the vetting/boarding process, the more predictable a system becomes
to the users. Predictability is equally detrimental to risk reduction; workers can become
complacent to an assembly-line mentality.
A key, stand-alone concept inferred from the literature was the importance of a
human-technology interface (HTI). I felt HTI was valuable enough to merit being
identified as a necessary condition for the intervening variables being examined.
In looking at the Total Airport Security System (TASS), this type of approach at
first seems nearly ideal. TASS employs a risk-layered approach by integrating security
cues from around the airport for a human to investigate; meaning this model also aligns
well with an emphasis on human-technology interface (HTI). As far as effectiveness, a
model capable of compounding security situational awareness has multi-fold value in
terms of effectiveness. Our reluctance to provide strong endorsement for using TASS in a
ferry or cruise ship environment comes down to the relationship between resilience and
efficiency. For instance, if TASS were to lose electrical power to a cruise terminal
quadrant, or the exterior CCTV-feeds were disabled by wind shear, would workers know
how to deliver contingency security on their own until the system came back up? TASS,
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or similarly designed products, may be highly efficient when all systems are operating
normally, but its’ efficiency can be compromised in situations where the model is not
highly resilient.
The concern here is that security would become so dependent on this all-solution
technology that resilience could become suspect in the absence of a total security system.
Until that resilience can be proven through use in the airport security industry over time,
endorsement is on hold for use of this human-technology model. Wet, salty, and windy
cruise ship and ferry environments will likely see technology fail from time to time and it
is imperative the system be resilient when a technology is unavailable.
The Social Force Model is highly advocated for use in inter-modal transportation
as a means to enhance uninterrupted visual acuity on passenger movement. My
endorsement relies on the Social Force Model’s ability to amplify the effectiveness and
efficiency of a system, in this case, CCTV. From a ferry terminal perspective, any model
that capitalizes on the current technology is a bonus. Ferry systems are typically a
component of the public/state transportation system, so it is far more economical to
enhance an existing security model than to replace the system entirely. A system like
Social Force Model supplements the existing system; it does not replace the system. In
light of current state budgetary restraints, a concept such as Social Force Model makes
sense, as the technology can grow with upgrades, such as those to CCTV systems.  The
other advantage of the Social Force Model over a TASS-type process is the operator is
not completely reliant on Social Force; if the link to the CCTV technology fails, the
CCTV, for example, is presumably still working. As far as risk-layering, maritime
security specialists should consider building redundancy into the technologies being used
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by security professionals; redundancy adds a layer of security to passengers as well as for
professionals who are increasingly reliant on technology.
In addition to redundancy, there must be a consistent element of randomness in
airport, ferry and cruise terminal security. Randomness is not a concept prevalent in
either the literature or data. Like airports, ferry and cruise security have departure and
arrival times that must remain steadfast if passengers are going to use these services. The
challenge for security personnel is meeting the demands of a clock-driven schedule,
while adjusting use of the models. This could involve randomly switching qualified
TASS operators, either by shift or assigned work areas.  Allowing different sets of eyes to
view a static terminal environment brings fresh perspective and encourages new ways of
looking at security. This type of approach creates unpredictability for adversaries who
may have learned the surveillance routine, and it also helps break security personnel from
a mind-numbing cycle. Randomness in a ferry or cruise environment should also include
random testing of security personnel and protocol. In addition to required drills onboard
the vessels, random drills at terminals ashore help keep security personnel alert and
prepared for both routine and worst-case scenarios.
A commonality between airport and ferry terminals is the high frequency, high
volume nature of passenger movement. In both modes, passengers tend to assemble in
congested queuing areas while waiting to board their transport modes (airplanes, ferries)
for relatively short duration travel purposes. Processes involving behavior detection, for
example may have utility in a congested and fast-paced ferry terminal. For ferries, where
huge volumes of passengers often check-in minutes before ferry departures, this could
involve use of skilled, roving behavioral detection security personnel. These roving
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personnel could be used in combination with a new way of looking at ferry-arrival
checkpoints. By example, a separate line could be assigned for frequent-ferry or early-
arrival passengers. These could include travelers who have completed background checks
and who predominantly commute daily, allowing them expedited passage through
security. For thousands using the Staten Island Ferry and Washington State Ferry
systems, this approach would embrace both efficiency and effectiveness. The caution
would be allowing a system to become so user-friendly in the interests of profit that
effectiveness was compromised. This is where ferry security agents could prove useful.
Trained in a dual role, these agents could randomly validate frequent-ferry passengers’
credentials to ensure a trustworthy system. The use of frequent- ferry passengers would
naturally shorten the other check-in lines. On these remaining check-in lines, the behavior
detection agents could rove, querying passengers who were exhibiting drunkenness, signs
of drug use, or other suspicious physiological cues. It would be essential for these agents
to be well-trained, mobile, and in continual interaction with command/control personnel
watching the terminal from a remote location. Also crucial, behavior detection agents
need to rapidly assess the intentions of the person-of-interest so as to avoid engendering
panic in a congested area, and to facilitate the majority of passengers boarding the ferry
in time. As there are no passenger lists for ferries, some form of behavior recognition
training and protocols should be considered an imperative.
Just as with airports, this type of approach would require ferry passengers to
tolerate a higher level of perceived intrusion. The approach would also need to consider
passenger volume as rapid behavioral assessments would be vital in a fast moving
transportation system. Locating these roving behavior detection agents near the terminal
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entrance would help deter adversaries by their presence and perimeter patrols would
minimize damage should the behavioral questioning go awry. Much like the Ben Gurion
International Airport example, ferry security volume as compared to airports may allow
trained screeners in a smaller transportation market to query anomalies without slowing
down the overall transportation system. This approach would likely not work in the cruise
industry, a travel industry as opposed to a mass transportation mode.
Conclusion
This study is intended to prompt discussion on how to develop a more holistic
way of looking at reducing risk in a transportation-system. Traditionally, airports, ferries
and the cruise industry have approached security of their transportation hubs with
solutions that have emerged from within their respective fields. I contend that as
transportation hubs around the globe continue to be threatened asymmetrically, it is
important to think in an equivalent manner regarding how to address intangible issues
before they reach the U.S and to identify measures needed to counter these threats. This
Chapter proposes using the full transportation spectrum in order to devise those solutions.
From a public transportation perspective, ferry security should evaluate airport protocols.
In the privatized world of transportation (and travel), cruise ship terminals can benefit by
looking to airport security as well. In terms of collaboration, public and private
stakeholders must work together. In more than a decade since 9-11, airports have
provided us with numerous prototypes. Both ferry and cruise terminals stand to benefit
from adopting, and adapting risk-mitigation principles to their own worlds of work.
The models assessed are but a few of the options available when considering a
cross-pollination of intermodal security practices. More important than the examples
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provided in this Chapter are the core risk-management principles deemed necessary for
solid U.S. transportation security and specifically, airport security. A well-rounded, risk-
oriented foundation is based on incorporating not one, but several core principles,
including efficiency, resiliency, effectiveness, and risk-layering. In summary, airport
security models that emphasize the stated core principles, incorporate partnerships,
indoctrinate randomness, and interweave humans with technology will transpose well as
future ferry and cruise terminal security models.
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Thesis Conclusion
The focus of this thesis has been on addressing risk-related issues peripherally
related to the introductory scenario in which a U.S. port security incident would likely be
associated with foreign shipping and originate overseas. This relationship makes a
connection between piracy and U.S. maritime risk. For example, a ship being hijacked in
the Straits of Malacca or robbed off Nigeria may actually be terrorists appearing to be
pirates, especially if piracy is so commonplace it goes unheeded. The Straits are a
location where piracy has always been a problem and the Gulf of Guinea is a region
where piracy is at present, highly unopposed. In these situations, an anhydrous ammonia
tanker stopped by pirates for several hours leaves enough time to cause damage. Divers
can attach an explosive device or pirates can board with 14 pirates and leave with 12, a
tactic that would intentionally strand stowaways onboard to accomplish their nefarious
purposes before (or upon) reaching the U.S. Neither of these piracy-related situations is
far-fetched. While many of our risk-reduction measures are designed to protect ports, it
may be the ships arriving that actually serve as the Trojan horse, meaning it is too late to
start protecting ports once a ship has already arrived.
These are the types of outliers that must be considered when viewing whether
piracy has ties to terrorism in Indonesia. As mentioned, 70% of U.S. shipping transits the
Straits of Malacca. This equates to thousands of large ships, destined for U.S. ports, all
passing through a narrow chokepoint. Regional piracy has direct linkages to American
security interests. If terrorists have actually eluded authorities, all is not lost. The
terrorists can still be defeated. As Chapter 1 suggests, counter-piracy initiatives can also
serve as effective counter-terrorism.
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In terms of offshore piracy, the thesis also examines what types of risk-variables
might threaten the U.S. As mentioned in Chapter 2, if pirates inadvertently alter how the
EU imports Nigerian oil for example, then this aspect of offshore piracy may threaten the
U.S., especially if Iran or Russia becomes alternate oil-providers to the EU. While the
global implications of piracy impacting EU imports do not mesh with our original
scenario, they still align with strategic U.S. risk-mitigation objectives. An envisioned
situation in which the EU decreases Gulf oil imports is not implausible. The U.S. after
all, has already reduced its own Nigerian imports. The U.S. however, has access to self-
sustaining energy alternatives that Europe does not.
This thesis has attempted through the first two Chapters to demonstrate linkages
between piracy and the originally stated scenario. Rather than being an exercise in fear-
mongering; the thesis broadened the opening-scenario beyond U.S. seaports in order to
trace the foreign piracy threats back to their source. The thesis also originally placed
emphasis on the tenets of balancing resource limitations and prioritizing risk variables
related to U.S. maritime security. Chapter 1, for instance, explored a nexus between
piracy and terrorism. Chapter 2 analyzed how offshore piracy affects when the U.S.
should view offshore piracy as a threat. Chapter 3 emphasized solutions and oriented the
paper to the idea of crossover utility. If maritime security can adopt transportation best-
practices that actually make airports safer, then emerging cruise ship markets or existing
ferry terminals should modify and incorporate these approaches as well.
The study has also revealed an interesting aspect to maritime risk. Not every
coastal nation wants the U.S. to help, yet nearly every nation hosts ports or vessels that
link back to the U.S. In the Straits of Malacca, deploying a U.S. naval presence to
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counter piracy would have likely elevated risk more than reducing it. In the Gulf of
Guinea, Nigeria elected to protect its waters and objected to U.S. (or NATO)
intervention. While U.S. efforts may have worked off Somalia, there was no Somalian
government to object. The role of sovereignty is a variable that should be highlighted
when calculating U.S. maritime risk. Fostering anti-American sentiments may be more
caustic than any threat posed by piracy. Another aspect of maritime risk is that America
is restrained in the ability to stop maritime threats beyond its own territorial seas and
must, alternatively, find creative approaches to handling overseas threats.
On a personal note, my experience working with DHS’ port security grants program
(PSGP) has left two indelible impressions regarding an adaptive approach to maritime
security. First, there is a deluge of good ideas taking place across the maritime
transportation security domain. Second, there is limited funding to support all of these
initiatives, nor would it be prudent to do so. Some of the grant proposals mirrored one
another, others offered reduced value based on the unlikeliness of their contingencies and
a few were simply cost unsustainable. I am convinced that protocols, such as those shown
to be successful in air transportation hubs can be adapted to maritime security, and
proposals that mitigate the vulnerability of ships requiring passage through dangerous
foreign waters offer value when thinking through risk-reduction practices.
This thesis did not aim to right-size a singular approach to maritime transportation
security.  Instead, it traced the ground wires of U.S. domestic security concerns to piracy-
related variables that originate in far-off places where U.S.-destined ships travel and
anchor. In the course of the examination on piracy, the value of collaborative
partnerships, strategic impacts, and overcoming challenges have come to light. Finally,
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the thesis identified crucial technology attributes offering lateral value to ferry and/or
cruise ship terminal security. Solutions that have already been field-tested in air or rail
transportation security and come at a reduced expense offer proven techniques for risk-
mitigation. Embracing transportation security measures that have crossover-utility
permits the U.S. to remain agile and adaptive, two qualities that help offset the
vulnerabilities of a continuous stream of foreign ships transiting in U.S. ports, or within
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